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· .... ~:· ~· !i£ithodologica.l Preamble 
What follows is not intended as a self-sufficient account of the Traotatus, but 
~ather as a series of . preliminary thought-experiments intended to suggest 
;.:o!l-!!"'fol:e -14-nes- o-:f- inve &t i:gation- in -elation ~to Wittgen.stein..!..s arly. thought ,. _______ _ 
scme of which may prove philosophically fruitful. Those which do, combined 
with other, more familiar approaches (through Frege, Hertz, Principia, Schopen-
r.~ue~, Mach, lCa.nt, etc.) could then be used to provide the necessary complete 
<..1,;c-.mt. l:nis shol.ll.d serve to forestall two sorts of criticism: (i) that these 
:::·afleotions are 'unbalanced': it is nowhere stated explicitly, for example, 
did so"' much as 
that Wittgenstein;raad Fraga during the period in question; and (ii) that they 
m83' undervalue the originality of Wittgenstein,by repeatedly failing to give · 
due weight to the hypothesis that Wittgenstein may have himself invented a con-
cept, problem, or term, independently of eny anticipations, of .the types dis-
ou1sed below1 in the works of Austrian and German philosophers and psychologists. 
But even where this hypothesis does in fact correspond to the truth this need 
not deprive the parallels involved of all philosophical interest in relation to 
the Tr.aotatus. For the latter is notoriously - indeed shamefacedly - a work 
shot through 'irith gaps at crucial points. And it seems at least conceivable that 
en investigation of the typical ways in which these gaps were filled by other, 
contemporary philosophers employing similar conceptual machinery •8\Y' have some 
ohmce of proving helpful in our understanding of the internal implications of 
Wittgenstein's thought. 
There is a third sort of criticism, which I certainly ~annot hope to forestall 
on the basis of the present (highly preliminary) version [of an essay parts ot 
which I hope to include in an introduction to my English trenslation of Rei.D-
ach 1911]. This turns on the factual errors and misunderstandings which the paper con-




§ 1 Wittgenstein's copy of the manuscript of the Tractatus, the copy seen by 
his colleagues during his time as a schoolteacher in Lower Austria, bore the 
title Der Satz, a title which may well have accompanied the familiar, more 
cumbersome titles (Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung / Tractatus Logico-Phil-
osophicus) in Wittgenstein's mind even in the time before the work was pub-
altemative 
lished. The English philosopher's temptation is to translate this/ title 
simply as The Pro;positron, despite arguments such as those presented by Shwayder 
(1954) and Schwyzer (1962) which suggest that a more suitable translation 
would be The Sentential Act (or perhaps: The Linguistic Act). But can this 
title be translated at all if we are to be sure of being adequate to Wittgen-
stein's intentions in using it? For each of these suggested English trans-
lations is a technical one, carrying none of the non-technical meanings assoc-
iated, in German, with the word '~\ 
To get some idea of what is at issue here let us recall the manner in which 
the Tractatus was written (or composed, as we might well say). Almost every 
day Wittgenstein would write down his thoughts - both personal and philosophical 
- in notebooks. These thoughts he would then sift and order, transferring 
those with which he was satisfied to further notebooks, deleting others as 
ppj_losophically irrelevant, sometimes removing whole sequences of thoughts 
which he had come to regard as resting on dubious insights. But Wittgenstein's 
conception of those propositions which remained, and which are set together in 
the Tractatus, was not the conception o~ one who is satisfied with that which 
is left over after a process of sifting and extracting. Much more must we con-
ceive Wittgenstein's attitude to the totality of his thoughts as being that of 
a fishmonger to a barrel of fish. The fishmonger extracts from the barrel 
wl)ich 
items for his own personal use and item~he can sell: the whole fish; 
2 
thenhe extracts also of what remains that which can be easily removed. But there is 
ii. residue of bones and oil and gfils silted at the bottom of the barrel, and the name 
for sediment of this kind in German is ~ ~, the leavings, the waste. 
Sometimes Wittgenstein was optimistic about the value of his work. He believed 
himself 'to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the pro-
bl.ems' (p.5). ~~in German is a leap ( ·~ grossen, mttchtigen, kUhnen, 
eleganten . Satz~ einen Graben,. Sometimes he was less optimistic. ~ ~ 
in German is what things will fetch, the market price: here is the sediment 1 
Wittgenstein is telling us, for what it's worth. 
In sifting his thoughts Wittgenstein was also, of course, putting them into 
order. But not into any linear order: thanks to the numbering system of the pro-
positions we have to deal rather with a complex interleaved ordering system, long 
numbers fitting within shorter numbers fitting in turn within still shorter 
numbers bounded by the whole book as container: · ·~·, in German, is the name 
for a ~ of Chinese boxes, and has the connotation of any closely fitting 
ordering system. 
Of more philosophical importance for our understanding of Wittgenstein is 
the meaning of '~' as a set of objects which belong together, especially in 
lan8'-.\8.ge relating to machinery (to engineering). Thus a~ is a set of tools, of 
drills, of machine parts, of lamps, of billiard balls, of playing cards; . 
finally a Satz is a set of furniture,(which reminds •s of Wittgenstein's 
remark at 3.1431: 
The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one com-
posed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of wr~tten signs.) 
3 
This also throws light on the inadvisability of the philosopher's identification 
- arrived at under the pressure of mathematical language - of 'set' in English 
with 'Menge' in German. The latter has the primary meaning of · mass, crowd, 
quantity, and the secondary meaning of class or extension; but it lacks aD"f 
. . 
connotation of the English 'set' (in !!!~set, etc.). 
There is a parallelism of language and music in Wittgenstein's works. {).141: 
'Der Satz ist kein WHrtergemisch.-(Wie das musikalische Thema kein Gemisch von 
THnen). 1 Cf. the important but little noticed parallelism between (say) Klavier 
spielen and Sprache spielen in Wittgenstein's later wor€J. A~ is,of course, 
any self-contained section in a piece of music, especially a complete movement 
(as it is a self-contained section in a game). But there is something more. ]2!!: 
Satz in logical and linguistic contexts now centrally denotes the proposition 
- -
not the result but 
or sentence itself; it originally denoted/the activity of Setzen, of positing, 
asserting, articulating, ordering. As alreadjr indicated,we find it necessary 
to adopt that interpretation of the ~tatus which rests on an identification 
of S§tze with just this kind of linguistic activity. What is interesting, from 
this point of view, is that in musical contexts this meaning of Satz is still 
-
• very much alive: ,!2!!~ Satz is the activity of composing sections of music,where 
of 
this involves the setting together /a number of tones. Thus Wi6land, describing 
a particularly fine section of a piece was led to cry out: 
KUnstlichkeit des Satzes, Freiheiten irn Satze, stranger Satz: gelt ! da 
ist doch reiner Satz~ fiiessende Melodie ! 
(What artistry, what freedom, what strength of composition: how true ! this 
is pure composition, the melody simply nows t) 
Perhaps, therefore, we should translate Wittgenstein's title sanewhat as 
follows: 
•As it is also in the context at'the composing room of a printing factory. 
""2 ,j w • 
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The Dregs (for what they're worth). {I have, in a manner of speaking, staked 
my life• on this tightly stacked nest of boxes relating to the activity of 
composing or articulating sentences, melodies - eventually also moves in a 
game: on the one hand it is a great leap forward; on the other band it is no 
more than sediment, attained by rather dubious scrapings of the bottom of the 
barrel of language after everything that is sayable has been removed: anyone 
who understands me will eventually recognise these leavings as nonsensical.) 
The nest of boxes was a trial to Wittgenstein. Life itself was a trial to 
Wittgenstein. If he did not die in the trenches he was convinced that he would 
commit suicide. Very much on his mind, therefore, was the problem of hie 
•• 
estate after his death. A term with which he would at this time have been 
familiar was the term 1Abhandlung• which in Austrian (though not in German) law 
designates a trial, indeed a specific kind of trial, the trial for the deter-
mination of a person's estate after death. (See ABGB ~797). We might there-
fore reasonably ask - following Waismann •••- whether there. is a:. deliberate 
legal c.Omiotation built into the title, Logisch-philosophische Abhand-
lung ,which the work bore when ac·cepted for publication . in a philosophical journal. 
(Perhaps Wittgensteinthought that the shorter title was too good for philos-
ophers). 
We can point to four important works as candidates for having had some influ-
ence on the style - the numerical style - of the Tractatus: Hertz's Mechanics, 
II 
Principia Mathematica, the Bible, and the Osterreichisches BUrgerliches Gesetz-
~,(t~e Austrian civil law code). Wittgenstein notoriously thought that 
·~ ~ = stake in a poker game. 
••• See p.2 of Shwayder, 1954. 
•~including his philosophical legacy 
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his work consisted of two halves, a written and an unwritten half, and that -1t 
was the latter, the unwritten half, which was the more important of the two. We 
encounter a further legal metaphor if we look for indications which might help 
us to understand the unwritten portion in such accounts as we have of Wittgenstein's 
attitude to life during the time in question. That which can be said relates to 
the facts ,!:a the world; that which cannot be said relates to that which is beyond 
the world. Engelmarm (1967) reports that 
the image of God as the creator of the World, hardly ever engaged 
Wittgenstein's attention, but the notion of a last judgment was of 
profound concern to him. 'When we meet again at the last judgment' 
was a recurrent phrase to him, which he used in many a conversation 
at a particularly momentous point. He would pronounce the words with 
an indescribably inward-gazing look in his eyes, his head bowed, the 
picture of a man stirred to his depths. (rp.77f). 
and 
The notion of a day of judgment,/of the associated rewards and punishments, gives 
structure, we might say, to the region which is outside the world, the region of 
which we cannot speak. I am not yet in a position to exploit this claim in such 
a way that it would throw light on Wittgenstein's meaning at the end of the~­
for supposing 
tatus, but I can give several independent reasons /that an investigation of 
Wittgenstein's thought in the light of legal theory may prove fruitful. 
The first of these reasonsturns on the parallelism which exists between the 
terminology of logic and the terminology of law, a parallelism which has existed, 
it seems, ever since the time of Aristotle. Consider,for example, the concepts 
of Gesetz, Grundgesetz~ Gesetzm~ssigkeit (Frege's 1893, the Grundgesetze der 
Aritbmetik,contains a discussion of the several meanings of the term 'law' 
followed by an explicit comparison of logic with an arbitrating judge, p.XIX)~ 
ev i ·dence (but not Evidenz in German); the Husserlian triple Intentio, Constitutio, 
6 
Fundatio, each of which owes its origins to the terminology of Roman law~ proof, 
Beweis, justification, judgment, Urteil, sentence (pass sentence = das Urteil 
fttl.len); foundation; Begrtlndung, validity, Geltung; argument; rule, ruling, form, 
formula, formality, legimation, etc. What is significant for our purposes is that 
in the Tractatus this parallelism is extended even further: there is a constant 
emphasis on~~ sein (being the case), (Wissen Sie,wie die Sachen sich 
verhaltan?cdo you know the_facts of the case?), (Verhalten •behaviour, con-
duct), Die Welt zerfttllt in Tatsachen (1.2), etc. 
How close the Tractatus comes to problems in the philosophy of law 
can be seen from a consideration of a paper by the legal theorist Gerhard (son 
of Edmund) Husserl on the nature of the legal trial,(1955). Despite the relative 
lateness of this essay and the very many conceptual and terminological 
parallels with the ~ractatus it seems from an investigation of G.Husserl's other 
works that an influence of Wittgenstein upon him has to be excluded. The paral-
first of all 
lels ought rather to'be explained, I would argue,/by appeal to the commoninflllence 
on both philosophers of the framework of 
./:..ideas pr6sented in E.Husserl's Logical Investigations and in (related) works cf 
Meinong and Stumpf, and secondly by appealing to the fact that one central idea 
of the Traotatus, that of the picture theory of meaning1 seems to have come to 
Wittgenstein whilst he himself was reflecting on the nature of a trial~atter 
reading a newspaper report of a Paris trial pertaining to a traffic accident in 
which models were introduced into the court. (Cf. Wittgenstein, 1961, p.7, 29.9. 
1914).For Husserl's paper begins with a discussion of~!• pictures,as these 
are used both inside and outside the context of a court: "Die Darstellung," he 
tells us (p.146), "ist Bild eines Etwas. Sie ist nicht dieses Etwas selber." 
It is not essential ~o the picture that it be a picture of something which exists 
7 
or which once ·existed: 
Es genUgt, dass das Dargestellte den ~ eines Wirklichen hat. Abgebildet 
kann nur warden, was wirklich sein k6nnte - wenn es nicht w:Lrklich ~ 
oder war. 
-
Die Abbildung ist selbst ein Ding der Wirklichkeit. Sie hat ihren Platz 
in Zeit und Raum. Ihren Sinn erhlil.t sie aber dadurch, dass sie auf etwas 
anders verweist, das sie - das Bild - nicht selber ist. (p.147) 
[rt is enough that something is represented which has the ~ of something 
actual. Only that can be depicted which could be real - whether or not it 
is or was real. 
- -
The depiction is ·itself a thing of reality. It has its place in time and 
space. But it acquires its sense in being referred to something else, some-
thing which is not the picture itself.] 
Thus when, on the stage in the theatre, the hero falls to the ground after having 
been 'stabbed:' by a dagger there is no real murder committed: a murder is repres-
ented~ one which took place, Perhaps, in the 16th century. We experience not a real 
murder but rather a state of affairs represented in a picture - ein im Bilde 
_dargestellten Sachverhalt (p.147) •which exhibits the essential characteristics 
of a murder. We might say that the two states of affairs, the depiction which 
unfolds upon the stage and the original murder itself, have in common. an 
identical kernel of sense,Csinneskern, p.148). 
It may seem, Husserl continues, that there is no connection between affairs of · 
the law and mere pictures, which belong to the world of aesthetic appearance. Far 
legal affairs are real, they have consequences, th~fulfil an eminently practical 
goal • Yet nevertheless, he goes on, it does not follow that the law cannot 
use depiction, Abbildung, of real processes as a means t6 the fulfilling of this 
goal. 
No legal process springs out of nothing. It is set in motion in order to solve 
some given problem, whether this is the death of a man, the breakdown of a mar-
8 
raige, the breach of a contract, the foundation of a trading company, or what 
have you. The lega1 order clearly wishes to come into contact with actual f~cta 
(facts which are, in general, facts of human behavio_yr._) ._This me.eta no-0pecial 
difficulties where the legal norms function between human beings without any 
the intervention of 
mediation of a legal process. Problems arise only with/ such a process, For 
facts, as -such, as entities which unfolded themselves in the past, can never 
themselves be experienced in a subsequent legal trial. Somehow a depiction 
of these facts must be created, using the materials available to and within the 
rules of procedure laid down by the court. What now is the means by 
which these states of affairs in the past are brought to representation? Typ-
ically,of course, we employ speech, but we may also, as G~Husserl points out 
explicitly (p.150), appeal to pictures or to three-dimensional models. 
Now the judge, in making his judgment, does not attach the relevant legal 
consequences to actual facts, facts which he himself has really experienced, but 
rather to possible states of affairs depicted in the actually uttered sentences 
or in pictures or models presented to the court. These are introduced into the 
locus of the trial first of all by prosecuting and defending lawyers. The witness 
is then brought forward to testify whether a given depicted state did or did 
not actually take place, he being someone who actually experienced the facts in 
question. But what he introduces into the trial is once again no more than the 
verbal representation of .that which he has seen. And the judge cannot reach 
through the witness's reports to the past facts, anymore than he could reach 
through the preliminary depictions of the lawyers. Thus the judge cannot properly 
say of anything: 'this is an actual fact'. All he can say, and does say, is: 'I 
am convinced that the report of the facts given by this witness corresponds to 
9 
the truth.' _ (Cf.op.cit.,p.151). 
What is the difference between the depictions of the theatre and the depictions 
of the court'l Only this:: that relative to the pic·torial representations which 
take place in the theatre any facts which may or may not correspond to the depict-
ed states of affairs are deliberately put into brackets, left out of accqunt, 
for the sake of our aesthetic appreciation of the play. In the court, however, 
this correspondence bet~een depicted statesof affairs and facts is precisely 
what·is put up for discussion. But because past facts cannot themselves be exper-
ienced in the court, the domain of depicted states of affair~, typically a domain 
determined by verbal reports, can never be transcended. 
So much for Gerhard Husserl's argument. But we here may go further than this. 
For let us suppose that the depictions of one court are called into question in 
another, second court, a court of appeal. Here the realm of depicted states of 
since 
affairs will be of' a different nature /the issues to be decided are now 
questions concerning the course of events in the original court. (The extent 
to which reports there followed the appropriate rules of procedure, etc.) But 
here too it is impossible to transcend ·the realm of depictions: no matter how 
many times the issue is taken to appeal, along a whole succession of higher and 
higher courts, there can never be any access to the facts themselves. In a 
certain sense, therefore, there is in the world no intrinsically higher court 
of appeal. Only God, the guardian of ontology, can make securely well-founded 
judicial decisions, but for these we will have to wait for the day of jUdgment, 
and that is not in the world but beyond it. Something like this, I think, 
is what Wittgenstein meant (in the 6.4's)when he said that there is, in the world, 
10 
nothing which is intr~nsically higher. 
We could not even test the validity of one legal process by setting it against 
another quite different, somehow more adequate legal framework. For just as we 
can never measure the correctness of a clock by comparing it, somehow, with the 
passage of time itself, but only by comparing it with !another clock, (6.3611) 
so we cannot measure the adequacy of a legal framework except by measuring it 
against another actually presented framework and never by appeal to 'the law' 
itself. 
§;. One final reason for introducing legal theoretical considerations into the 
discussion of the Tractatus turns on the importance of the German legal phen-
omenologiat Adolf Reinach as the first philosopher to subject the notion of 
Sachverbalt to a rigohrous philosophical investigation. (See his 1911 and my 
discussions in!, and!)• Both Reinach and Wittgenstein were of Jewish descent, 
born at roughly the same time, and had in common certain important personality 
traits: both were extremely charismatic, and suffered from the exhausting effects 
of their philosophical thinking and teaching, though Reinach recovered from 
exhaustion not by watching films and reading detective magazines but by pla,-
ing games of dominoeso Both were passionate readers of Augustine's Confessions; 
and Reinach once remarked, in a very Wittgensteinian vein, that 
Thedi.fference between himself and others was that they needed a 
reason to be sad, while he needed one to be happy. (Oesterreicher,1952 
p.89 ). 
Unfortunately 
/whilst Wittgenstein returned from the front, Reinach was killed in battle 
in 1916, shortly afte~ having been conve~ted to Christianity- ~d after having 
11 
sketched out, in the trenches, the main ideas of a vast work on our cognition of 
the Absolute•(it seems that Reinach was attempting to put into words-the second, 
unwritten half of Wittgenstein's Tractatus). The effect of Reinach's personality, 
ih this period, on those who knew him, is well-testified by the fact that, sub-
sequent to his death his wife, his sister, his brothe:P. and sister-in-law and 
several friends and pupils one by one entered the church. Indeed his sister joined 
the Benedictine nuns o~ Mont Vierge, Belgium, where Reinach1 s depth and piety had 
already become so well known that on the day before his sister arrived at the 
nunnery the Prioress addressed the Chapter as follows: 
Tomorrow we shall have the great joy of welcoming to our community a 
new member, who is, even according to the flesh, a sister of Our Lord. (!) 
(Oesterreicher, .2E_•cito 1 p.118). 
What is philosophically important about Reinach's works for our purposes, though, 
is that Reinach developed an extremely detailed philosophical method (which he 
applied not only in the field of law, but also in the philosophy of mathematics 
and logic, philosophy of language and,fina1ly, ethics and the Absolut;k At the very 
centre of this method was the concept of Sachverhalt, a term which,as I have tried 
to show elsewhere (see !) , Reinach uses in a manner which is closer than any ot.her 
philosopher of the time to the way in which it was used by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus. For someone unfamiliar with Reinach 1 s works it is difficult to be-
lieve the extent to which Reinach employed the Sachverhalt concept in-the solution 
on Sachverhalte 
of philosophical problems. Reinach founds his philosophy of numbei/, for example, 
in explicit opposition to Frege and his definition of numbers as applying to 
(See his 1921a) 
concepts./ The whole of Kant's theory of analytic/synthetic judgments, the whole 
df logic and the theory of judgment, the whole philosophy of science including 
•cf.H. Conrad-Martius'~Introduction~to Reinach 1921. 
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the problems of causality and induction are all of them, in Reinach's works, re-
b·uilt around the notion of Sachverhalt, a phenomenon which, were it not for the 
Tractatus, would be quite unique in the history of philosophy. What I hope to 
show, in the final version of the present paper is that there are important 
reasons why Reina~h, with his legal training, found a central, and eventually 
an ethical and religious importance in the Sachverhalt concept. I hop.e to show 
also that legal-theoretical considerations may perhaps throw some liBht on that 
other early 2oth century Sachverhalt ontology expressed in the Tractatus. 
P.ein=.eh ~~c ~ot ~ icolat~d phtlvawpha~.ne was rooted in a tradition which, 
in various guises, had achieved an important position in the German-speaking 
philosophical and psychological communities by 1911. I have said something else-
• where about the strictly philosophical aspects of this tradition. In the second 
half of this paper I want to say something about the method as it expressed itself 
in psychology, and to show that there are here, too, important parallels with, 
perhaps even influences upon, the Tractatus. 
~ J. First, however, I wish to make a short excursion into social philosoph;y. In 
.¥'+• 
particular I want to consider the notion of (social and intellectual) stratific-
ation; 
(note that this term · · 
· ;bas found its way into social theory from palaeontology, 
the science of fossil remainsl. It seems clear that there are certain societies 
in which the idea of stratification, of hierarchical ordering, of differences of 
level, is stressed, is freely accepted, in many different spheres; and other 
' societies in which hierarchies are as far as possible suppressed, and in which 
those differences of level which survive are somehow camouflaged. Clear cases 
of the former would be medieval England with its hierarchy of King, barons, thanes, 
•Its leading figures were, perhaps: Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Stumpf and Ktnpe. 
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knights, freemen, serfs ••• , the British Empire in its heyday, and, of course, 
the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Typical examples of the latter, reduced 
·social orderings are England in the 1930's and •4o•s, and Austria after the 
fall of the Habsburgs. It is beyond my competence to draw any historical con-
clueione concerning the opposition between these two kinds of 
society. And nor do I wish to make facile generalisations concerning the relation-
ship between the orde~g of a society and the kind of philosophy (reductionist 
or non-reductionist) to which it gives rise. (Not that I exclude the possibility 
of interesting results in this field: see, in particular, Ny{ri, 1972, 1974, 
1976, 1976a). I want to make rather the much simpler point that those societies 
with highly conspicuous stratificational orderings (of various types) will 
demand the development by social theorists of conceptual machinery adequate to 
those orderings; I then hope to show that conceptual machinery thus developed 
has sometimes been adapted by philosophers for their own, perhaps quite different 
purposes. 
One particularly interesting example of conceptual advance in response to 
a stratificational social ordering is provided by the work of the 12th century 
legal theorist Henricus Bractonis (Henry Bracton): To oversimplify somewhat we 
can say that in the feudal system all land was the property of the King, but 
then also separate constituent parcels of this land were the property of dif-
ferent grades of lord, down to the individual clods of earth farmed by serfs. 
·. 
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There is a clear problem which arises when we ask how these different people 
could each of them own the same parcel of 1and. Before Bracton this problem 
had been purportedly solved by appea1 to different modi habend.i Ql.l the_different 
such . 
levels. Bracton saw, however, that there can be only one/modus 1 . that :1f a persan 
owns a thing then he owns -.it, and that is that. His solution to the problem 
was to deny that it is·'~ thing which is owned by all of these people. Rather 
we have to deal here with a hierarchy of different legal creations, higher-order 
intentional objects (in the terminology of Smith, :B, adapted from Ingarden, 1964/65, 
vol.II/1). Each of .these legal creations is related, in different ways. to the 
underlying clods of earth, but they differ amongst each other in occupying dif-
ferent positions in what we might call·legal space. These creations of law were 
called estates: ~he crown estate related to that parcel of land which extended 
across the whole country, but it was not identical with that land, as can be 
seen from the fact that the King had certain limitations on his rights relating 
to it. Individual lords of various grades below the King then each owned the ap-
propriate estate, down to the tenants of lowest order who, according to the 
theory, were regarded as owning the land itself rather than any higher-order 
legal creation resting upon a set of tempora11y determined rights relating to 
the land. (For a more detailed - and more accurate-account of the theory see 
• G.Husserl, 1969, and Plucknett, 1956). 
-~--------------------------------- - ---
.•The notion of estate acquired a central position in English social and 
political life. As one jurist put it:'What a man had largely determined what he 
was. His status as a legal person depended on his legal estate and tenure in 
' English land. 
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The polymorphous hierarchica1 society which was Austria-Hungary gave birth, 
in its social theory, to a stratificational ontology of a highly insightfUl 
kind, resting on a conceptual advance which was much more deep -~c~ \l\.j than 
that which had been effected by Bracton, since the ordering system which it 
involved was not one which could have been obtained merely by "reading off" 
en ordering of strata overtly manifested in aociety. I ref er to the 
revolutionary account of the capita1 structure which was presented by Carl 
Menger in his Grundstttze der Volkswirtschaftslehre .<Principles of Economics) 
of 1871, a work which served as an economic handbook to the Habsburg Empire 
during the period of economic and political liberalism which followed its pub-
lication. The notion of a capital structure was itself to a large extent orig-
inal to the Viennese School of economics which Menger founded.• Hitherto it 
had been customary to take for granted the homogeneity of 11capita1" (as measur-
able, e.g., purely in terms of land, or in terms of money-in-the-bank), with a 
consequently devalued conception of the role of the capitalist. "11.e latter 
comes to be seen within Austrian economic theory. as having the indispensable 
fUnction of preserving the capital structure (and also, where possible, of 
developing it) in the face of continual changes in its determining conditions1 
(changes, for example, in the availability of raw materials, in consumer tastes, 
changes caused by epidemics, wars and other actions of governments, and, of 
course, changes caused by the activities of other capita1ists). 
Oversimplifying somewhat we may sketch Menger•s account of this structure as 
follows: the economic activity in a society is of value only to the extent that 
it satisfies the needs of consumers, ioe. that it leads to the creation of goods 
whose purchase is held to yield an immediate increase in the psychic income of 
the purchaser. There are only certain goods, however, which have this quality 
(goods such as foodstuffs). Other goods (cooking utensils, for example) do ndt 
•other important members of the school include: Fovon Wieser, E.von BHhm-Bawerk, 
L.von Mises and F.H.von Hayek (the latter a distant cousin of Wittgenstein). For 
reasons which will become clear in the sequel, Menger's school has also been 
called the First Austrian School of Value-Theory, in virtue of _its manifold rel-
ations to the 'Second' such school, comprising especially Brentano, Meinong, 
Ehrenfels, Witasek and Ma1ly. See Eaton, 1930, p.16o 
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directly serve to satisfy any needs at all. It is of course on the word 
'directly'which e~erything hangs; for each of the goods of this latter group can 
be used in some way as to contribute to the production of direct need-satisfying 
go~ds. Meng~r called the first,_ ne_e~tisfying goods goods of first order. Goods--
which ara used, in combination, to produce goods of first order Menger called 
goods of second order (for example: a cooking stove, a pan of water, raw potatoes, 
together with fUel, constitute a complementary set of goods of first order). Goods 
used to produce goods of second order (for example the knife which peeled the 
potatoes) me goods of third order and so on. Clearly it is nothing intrinsic to 
a good which deterin:ines its position, at any given time and in any gi.v~n ft)..!!~ti~~. 
in the rank structure: this depends exclusively on the decisions of the capitalist 
(and clearly within the Mengerian framework the housewife peeling and cooking 
potatoes is, to this extent, a capitalist).· The ordering of the rank structure 
is therefore an ordering which is dependent upon particular networks of acts 
of consciousness on the part of subjects who react, in determinate (but sometimes 
highly original) ways,to changes in the underlying conditions.by thereby cause 
changes in the rank structure which will, in their judgment, lead to inc-
reases in the psychic incomes of consumers. 
Clearly there is no suggestion that the capitalist should conceive himself 
as standing in any kind of conscious relationship to'the capital structure' as 
such (as if he were some kind of gardener, charged with the task of preserving 
the order of a large garden from season to season). His relationship is rather 
directly to the goods themselves (those goods which fall within the locus of 
his particular interests), and in this he differs from the consumer only in .that 
his interests include also goods of higher order within their orbit. It is in 
explaining the psycholpgical mechanisms by means of which the interests of the 
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capitalist express themselves in the market in such a way as to lead to the 
maximum of consumer satisfaction under any given set of initial conditions 
(especially conditions relating to the limitations on our knowledge at any given 
time) that Mangers greatness lies. And it was almost certainly this psych-
ological achievement which attracted Meinong and Ehrenfels to Menger•s lectures 
philosophers 
in Vienna, both/revealing an important influence of the latter in their works 
on value theory and psychology. · To Ehrenfels, the titular father of -Gesta1t psy-
return _ 
chology~ we shalJ/below. Meimmg' s first major published work( 1894) he conceived 
~s a generalisation of Manger's approach to economic goods (of _fir~t and lµ.gher 
order) to goods (valued objects) in general. In his. later . wor~s this generalisation 
..,as ce.rried even further, -taking the fora of 8:. completely ·general theory of objects 
(of first and hi&ier order). 
Now Meinong•s paper "On Objects of Higher Order" (1899) was among the 
"taks subjected to thorough txeatmart by Russell in the six articles which he wrote 
on Meinong during the period from 1902 to 1907, precisely the period between 
his discovery of the paradox in Frege•s Grundgesetze and his invention of the 
ramified hierarchy of types (the theory of types~ orders)! One is therefore 
tempted to suggest that there is an echo, in Russell's terminology of 'higher 
orders' and e.g. in the now so widely accepted terminology of 'higher order logics•, 
of Meinong's ontology and of Menger'srpsychology'(a suggestion whose philosoph-
ical importance consists, perhaps, merely in the fact that it reveals how 
inadequate is our understanding of the early history of mathematical logic in 
particular and of analytic philosophy in general, particularly as this relates 
to the thought of France, Germany and Austria). 
•see Russell, 19o4, 1905, 19o6, 1907 and the references to "the excellent 
Herr Meinong:" in his The Princinles of Mathematici:: (1qo7J). 
18 §5• It is difficu1t for us to appreciate the extent to which psychol.ogica1 issues 
determined the course of philosophy at the turn of the century. Perhaps the 
best comparison would be- that between psychology at that time and logic m 
linguistics today: for each of these disciplines have, in order, broken free 
from philosophy, thereby determining across a wide front the problems and con-
cepts which philosophers find important and the methods which philosophers have 
found themselves using. It is, I would claim, impossible to understand very niany 
worl'Spublished between, say, ·1871 and 1921, without a very clear awareness of the 
role of psychology -in influencing (e.g.) the set of questions to which they are 
addressed. We can get some idea of the importance of psychology if we reflect 
. . 
that in the 18901 s A.Httfler, with the help of Meinong, wrote a two-volume 
introduction to philosophy, used widely as a textbook in schools and universities 
throughout the Empire, the first volume of which was, in fact~ a textbook of logic, 
the second a textbook of psychology~ Philosophy, then, at least from one point 
of view, was conceived as resting upon these two parts, logic and psychology, 
with, of course, manifold interconnections between the two. And what was 
true of Austria was no less true of Germany, nor of England, especially Cambridge, 
where, as we shall see in more detail below, scientific psychology first took 
root on this side of the channel. 
Scientific psychology began in Germany, effectively with Herbart's Psychologie 
a1s Wissenschaft, neu gegrtlndet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik (1824/25). 
Herbart's influence in Germany combined with that of experimental physiologists 
(such as Weber) and physicists who had turned their attention to problems of 
sensation (such as Helmholtz) led to a veritable explosion of experim~tal 
psychology in that· country, especially with the work of Wundt and his school. 
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But Herbart's infl..uence was equally great4in Austria where the'empirical'(non-
experimental) psychology of Brentano was founded, a psychology which found 
important echoes not only in Husserl's phenomenology but also in the work of Meinong 
and 
/Stumpf ,and in the later experiments of the WUrzburg school to which we shall have 
to turn below. From the time of Wundt and Brentano experimental psychology 
became an Austro-german export. James and Titchener, for example, in America, 
represented the infl..uence of Wundt; Ward and Stout in Cambridge the infl..uence 
of Herbart and Brentano. By the time Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge psych-
ology had been made into a compulsory subject for the Moral Sciences tripos; and 
for this subject Moore gave lectures some of which were almost certainly attended 
by Wittgenstein, lectures at which the principle textbooks were the works of 
Ward and Stout.(For references see Hallett, 1977). It was against this background 
that Moore had read and been so impressed by Brentano•s work on ethics, and that 
Russell had done his considerable work on Meinong, including a review of Meinong's 
book on the Weber-Fechner law concerning the intensity of sensations. Dawes 
Hicks and the American Critical Realists, too, were closely involved in the 
early growth of psychology under the special infl..uence of Meinong'e work. Dawes 
Hicks in particular served as an assistant in C.S.Myers Cambridge Institute for 
Experimental Psychology, the first such institute to be founded in England (as 
Meinong had founded the first in Austria-Htuigary). Experimental psychology was, 
when Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge, already a highly technical subject,though 
- and this will ha_ve important philosophical consequences for what follows -
one lacking~ kind of self-consciousness .or self-confidence. Yet it seems 
that Wittgenstein was already something of an expert (though one who always 
maintained a cynical stance relative to the discipline of psychology). Thus 
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for example he later showed himself capable of giving an explanation of the 
Weber-Fechner law in a way which suggested more than a mere knowledge of Rua~ell's 
· Witt$enst~in 
r~view of Meinong's book on the subject (see / 19bZ, p.41); he attended 
psychological meetings organised by Myers; he exhibited a machine for measuring 
reactions to rhythms at the opening of Myers' new Institute building; and he 
~-. ..:..rried out experiments of his own in Myers' laboratories. (See Wittgenstein 1974). 
This immediately raises the question as to where Wittgenstein acquired his 
knowledge of and his_ interest in the subject. The first possibility which sug-
Samuel Alexander 
gests itself is Manchester:/,the professor of philosophy during Wittgenstein's 
time there,was - like most other major philosophers of the day - a passionate 
follower of the fortunes of scientific psych~logy, having himself studied in the 
Freiburg laboratories of H. Mttnsterberg and, what will be important for what 
follows, having · maintained a correspondence with the German philosopher-
psychologist Oswald KUlpe.• It seems also possible that Wittgenstein may have 
had contact with T.H.Pear, later Professor of Psychology at Manchester, perhaps 
even that it was Pear who put Wittgenstein into contact with c.s.Myers. 
Another possibility is that Wittgenstein acquired something of his knowledge .of 
experimental psychology during bis time in Berlin. We already know that as a 
youth Wittgenstein had read Helmholtz's works on the senses of vision and hear-
ing, one of Wittgenstein's main interests being the psychology of music and 
•There is little evidence of any contact between Wittgenstein and Alexander 
in Manchester, though it has been conjectured that it was Alexander who was 
instrumental in sending Wittgenstein to see Frege in Jena. See Ambrose and 
Laaerowitz, 1972, p.2..7l. 
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sound. It seems hardly conceivable. that he would not have become familiar with 
the classic work on the psychology of sound since Helmholtz, the two-volume 
Tonpsychologie (1883/90), written by Carl Stumpf who had for l2. years been 
Professor of Philosophy and a leading figure in the intellectual and musical 
life of Berlin - the musical capital of the world - when Wittgenstein arrived. 
Every serious discussion of tm psychology of sound in general and of the psych-
ology of music in particular published in the first decades of this century had to 
take accmmt of Stumpf's works. (Note also that there is a further, quite inde-
pendent reason for supposing that Wittgenstein had some contact with Stumpf or 
with philosophers close to Stumpf, for it was the latter who introduced the term 
1Sachverhilt' into the language of technical philosophy, and there is as yet no 
obvious explanation as to how Wittgenstein got hold of the term while working 
on the Tractatuso For details see Smith! and .Q.) 
The influence of psychological issues in the Tractatus seems obvious. We have, 
first of al1, the well-explored influence on Wittgenstein's early thought of 
Schopenhauer and Mach. In the text itself we can discern, for example in the 
2.01's and 2o02 1s a stress on the knowledge of objects, on the manner in which 
• 
objects are given, on our being able to think a ~pace empty, and the examples 
Wittgenstein uses here and throughout the work, relating to specks in the visual 
field, to the senses of sight, touch, and hearing, are examples which belong to 
the experimental psychology laboratoryo In the 3's Wittgenstein introduces the 
though undoubtedly Fregean in origin 
term 'Gedanke 1 (thought) in a manner whicWpoints less tc:> the influence of Frege's 
•eternal realm of thoughts' than to the use of this term in the works of WUrzburg 
psychologists(di~cussed in detail below) .At 401121 Wittgenstein takes it 
for granted that psychology is a natural science, and here he explicitly compares 
•forms of speech which are· even more common in the Notebooks (see Witt~~nstein 1Qh1L 
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bis method not, indeed, to psychology, but to the philosophical •study of 
thought-processes,which philosophers used to consider so essential to the p~-
osophy. of log!o'• At 2021.~_we~findJ'/ittgenstein appealing- to the -Necker -cube 
in his discussion of the perception of complexes. Most important for our 
purposes however is Wittgenstein's discussion of the problem of solipsism.. This 
problem, as Wittgenstein conceived it, was not simply a limit position from the 
philosopher's armoury of comical tricks; it was a central, foundational problem 
of the new scientific psychology: how, namely, does the psychologi.c~ subject 
break through the solipsistic circle of his perceptionR: tho~eht~. feeli!!.ge, etc., 
to reach an objective world. Some followers of Brentano had denled that we 
could break out of this circle. It wae in opposition to this view that Theodor 
Lipps, grandfather of the Munich group of phenomenologists to which Reinach 
belonged, developed bis theory of empathy, a theory which was later adapted by 
Husserl for the solution of the same probleM. 
The philosophical ego, Wittgenstein1ells us, is not the human being or the 
human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit 
of the world and not a part of it.(5.641). And solipsism, when all its implications 
are followed through strictly, coincides with pure realis~: The self of solipsism 
shrinks to a point without extension and there remainG the reality coordinated 
with it (5.64). These remarks remind us of the passage in which T.S. Eliot 
summarises the account of the soul defended by Theodor Lipps (1964, p.71)• 
*Beside Lipps - and Meinong - the central figure in this work -(a Harvard 
dissertation sub'l!itted by Eliot in 1916)- is F. He Bradley, 
in whose thought also the philosophical~psychological. problem of solipsism . 
had played a central role, see Cho21 of his 1893. 
23 
The ~ and its objects form metaphysically one whole, a whole from 
which we can abstract in either direction ••• (p.79:) the soul ie,in fact, 
the whole world of its experience at any moment. 
In fact it seems clear that the central problem in the foundations of psychology 
in Wittgenstein's day was precisely the problem of the nature of the soul , of 
:.'he psychological ego, of the conscious subject. For the experimental psychologists, 
jealous of their new discipline, were forced into the position where they had to 
give an account of what it was, in their experiments, which they were investigating. 
Not the body or some part of the body (say, the central nervaus system), since this 
fell within the province of experimental physiology• And not the mind 
(or reas~n or thought or the understanding) either, in the sense in which these 
were then conceived, for they all fell centrally within the province of philosophy 
as this had been determined by the still-philosophical psy.cholog1 of the old, pre-
experimental days. Many conservative thinkers denied, indeed, that a science of 
poychology was possible at all:"'one of the chief conclusions of Eliot's disser-
tation, for ~xample, arrived at by standard Bradleyan arguments, is that psych-
ology as science cannot exist, that all of its results must rightly be assigned 
either to physiology on the one hand, or to philosophy on the other. Wittgenst~, 
in contrast, was concerned to keep philosophy and psychology rigidly separate -
(in this he was at one with Husserl and with Frege) - and hence ·his treatment 
of the problem of the nature of the soul at the conclusion . of the Tractatils. 
~~ Now the first philosopher to have nilrtured the idea of psychology as a 
science was, as we have already seen, Herbart, and it is Herbart's solution to 
the problem: what is t~e object of scientific psychology? which formed the 
sta.."'1:ing-point for all subsequent solutions, ~eluding, as we shall see, the 
•This was certainly true of Kant. 
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50 \ 1..1~:ion proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Herbart is, perhaps, the 
cn~c i ~1. ly- important figure for any understanding of Austrian philosophy of the 
~,~co."l.d half of the 19th century; his followers filled most of the chairs of 
philosophy in Austria during the period, and Merbartian educational p~ychology 
f omed the basis for the curriculum and teaching methods in educational estab-
~ . .l.snments throughouJ~ the impire. Herbart's theory of inhibition and of the un-
c:.nscious seems to ~ve influenced Freud's psychoanalysis•, and his philosophy 
influenced such important thinkers as Lotze, P'echner, •• Husserl, Frege, Lf,pps, Ward, 
Stout, Wundt, Mach, Avenarius, Bradley, and Riemann. 
It seems, then, that we must come to some fair impression of. the nature of 
Herbart's psychology, and for this it is important to realise the break with 
tradition which was effected in Herbart's works. Before Herbart metaphysicians 
had started with the mind as given; only :then were they led to consider the 
ideas (thoughts,acts ••• ) of the mind, and thus they repeatedly encountered the 
problem of explaining the relationship between the mind and its ideas, e.g. by 
appe~ to myserious forces called 'faculties'. Herbart reverses this orderof ap-
preach. He resolutely dismisses the soul from the experienced world (from the realm 
of that \\hi.ch can be the subject~matter of our investigations). Instead ft is placed 
- in effect-at the limit of the world, since its nature is totally unknown and 
forever remains so. Herbart starts, instead, with the ideas themselves: the 
soul• he says, has no power to call up, make, keep or recall an idea or to deduce 
one idea from another. All these matters the ideas arrange amongst themselves. . 
Here we see one possible germ of . Wittgenstein-'s claim that logical inference 
and eventually thought itself must take care of itself. (Cf. e.g.5.132). 
•see Klein, History of Scientific Psychology, Pt· 7to1- 777. 
••-perhaps& see his 1884, p.iii. 
... 
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E:ow the · ideas of each individual subject combine and interact, and how -
::".':C-3t importantly for Herbart, a thinker whose main direct contribution to the 
history of ideas has been in the field of pedagogical theoey•the ideas . ,. :. · .. -0? 
of a given subject change and develop through time, are matters to which we 
shall return only after we have discussed the general ontologica~ (or metaphya-
.,..cal) tr·aJ1ew-.)rk wit~ which Herbart was working. Herbart's ontology may most 
correctly be .desigr..~ted. as an atomistic realism. The world consists of a plur-
alit:~ of absolutely simple a.toms (which Herbart calls Real.en).. His argument for 
the existence of such simples - as far. as I can understand it - seems to rest on 
an appeal to the Aristotelean identity .theory of the predicate (a theory which, 
we rn'.tst remember, was almost mri.versally held, in one or other form, by logicians 
up to t:he time of Frege). According to this theory the 'is' in 'S is p' is an 
'is' of identity. If we interpret this view in what seems, for our present pur-
p~ses, to be th0 ~ost intuitively acceptable way, then we may say that 'S is p' 
is to be re-expressed~ in canonical form, as: 'Some part (or accident) of S 
is identical. with p'. 'Socrates is red', for example, expresses the identity 
some part of 
~r;socrat'-· .e wi.th ( some individual accident) red. Now, Herbart argues, what is 
-
•real', the ultimate furniture of the universe, c_annot have a multiplicity of 
determinations, for let us suppose that S denotes such a rea1, and that S has 
the different deterrninations a, b, c; i . e.,in canonica..?- form1part of S, say s1, 
is identical. with a, another part of S, say s2 , is identical with b, and a third 
part, s3, with c. Now suppose s1, s2 and s3 are non-id~nticaJ..parts of s •. From 
this it follows that S can be decomposed into a number of different parts; but 
then these parts are more ultimate, ontologically speaking, than S, which con-
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rra .:iicts our hypothesis. Hence s1, s2 and a3 are all identical to each other. 
_... ... ~ then since s 1 =a, s b s c it f 11 that b d id ti al 2 _= ' 3 = , o ows a, , an c are en c , 
which contradicts the hypothesis that S enjoyed a number of distinct determinat-
ions. Hence by reductio ~ absurdum we must conclude that what is real is 
• ~b~olutely simple. 
How, then, does it come aboutthat we are presented, in our experience, with 
.. 
objects having a multiplicity of attributes7 According to Herbart all attributes 
are a consequence of combinations among reals. (Compare Wittgenstein at 200231: 
[die] materielle Eigenschaften ••• werden.;;.erstdurch die Konfiguration der Gegen-
.,,. 
stMnde-gebildet•.) "' To see a real S as !!~' corresponds, according to Herbart, to ex-
i)er:iend.ng·S in combination with a series of fUrther reals, say, s1-,s.2 ,s3• •• • 
it 
To see S as ~to experiencing/in combination with a different aeries, say 
81•, 82
1
, s3• •••• That it is the ~ object S which is seen as both hard and 
real is a consequence of the fact that this is a common element in both series, 
as the centre of a circle is the common element in every radius. 
~eibniz, it seems,employed a different version of the identity theory of the 
predicate, and it seems plausible that the diffe~ences between his monadological 
atomism and Herb~B ~-theory (discussed below) turn on differences in the-two 
versions of Aristotle's theory. An open problem, which X leave to minds capable 
of more intricate thought-connections than my own, is the following: that Wittgen-
atein 1 s Tractarian atomism stands to the Fregean function-argument theory of the 
predicate,as Herbart's and Leibniz's atomisms stand to their respective versions 
of the Aristotelean identity theory. 
••Material properties are only produced by the configuration of (absolutely simple] 
objects. 
-- - - -- .... -~--
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Thus the intuitive conception, according to which the several attributes 
'possessed by' an object share a single locus, ia overturned; instead we have to 
recognise that every attribute (individual accident) possesses a plurality of 
(absolutely simple) loci or, more precisely, that wherever there is the appear-
ance of an attribute there is in truth a plurality of reals. 
The first and most obvious application of this theory is to the problem of 
... 
change in objects through time. In fact we can construct a reductio argument 
exactly parallel to the above which would show that if 'S is a• is true at time 
t 1, •sis b' at time t 2 and Sis an ultimate real, then a and bare identical, 
·from which it follows that there can be no change in reals over time. What 
we conceive as a change in S from being a to being b is, in fact, a change in 
the stock of reals which are in combination with S at different times. As Witt-
genstein put it: 
Der Gegenstand ist das Feste, Bestehende; die Konfiguration 1st clas 
Wechselnde, Unbestttndige. (2.0271)• 
And from this it seems obvious that the Herbartian appeal to a kind of 
'linear combination' among reals has much in common with Wittgenstein's 
account in the Tractatus of Sachverhalt-configuration of simple objects. 
•objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what 
is changing and unstable. 
Cf. also 2.021: Objects make up the substance of the world •. That is why they 
cannot be composite. 
2.027: Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. 
The· kernel of W~ttgeneteill'l!l _rlew_af_::.''9~9-' ccmflgurationis effectively a 
MO<ii t~ed version of Frege's theory of saturated and unsaturated entities. 
\'i~.· e :~c for Frege saturated· objects are conceived as 'cam_p]:etin ~unsaturated 
i:Llllctions to yield saturated collapsed statal entities (truth values: see my !_, 
pc9), for Wittgenstein it is the absolutely simple objects themselves which are 
t~nni,_turated (or perhaps we should say ~-unsaturated), and such objects - where 
-~hey are of such a form that they 'fit into each other', perhaps in the way in 
... 
which Aristotelean individual accidents fit into each other, - combine to yield 
•• r;:; 
saturated states of affairso (Cf. Allaire, 1963). ~ote, in passing, that for 
Wittgenstein thus to treat objects very much as Frege had treated concepts 
would not have been, eog. terminologically, a great leap: Moore in "The Nature 
of Judgment" had treated concepts and objects as in effect identical; for 
Russell in the E!:!nciples (1903) both concept and object belonged to the same 
ontological category of items or terms. Further Meinong•s Gegenstandstheorie 
included concepts within its orbit, and concepts were included by Reinach 
in the cate~ory o~ objects. Indeed,since Reinach and Wittgenstein both share 
the same dualistic ontology of objects on the one hand and statal entities (~­
on the other, 
verhalte and Tatsachen)/we might expect to gain ~ome useful insight into the 
meaning which is acquired by the German word 'Gegenstand' when it is brought 
within this kind of dualist framework by comparing the "tables of entities" ad~ 
mitted,respectively,by Wittgenstein and Reinacha-
•Cf. the discussion of the meaning of 'Satz' in § 1 above. 
••I hope to be able to provide a fuller account of what thistfitting together' 
c·ould be in a later version of this paper, appealing first of all to Stumpf' s 
theory of dependent and independent parts and to the whole-part theory· .presented 
in Husserl\s IIIrd Logical Investigation, especially as this has been developed 
by the German logician Wolfgang Degen. 
·. 
WITTGENSTEIN: 
Objects (all simple) 
[Gegenst~de] 
Statal entities 
[ Sachverha1te and Tatsachen J 
... 
REINACH: (see his 19~1; esp.p.82) I 
Some or 
a11 of: 
Objects (actual, possible & impossible) 










Satzelemente = einfache Zeichen1= 
names? 
••• 
Sachverha1te (all simple) : 
contingently obtaining and·nori-obtaining 








(facts not actualised 
as pictures)" · 
~tic-temporal . op~eot!L.(simple 





thoughts and thought-units 








contingently obtaining states 
" non- n 11 
analyt~cally 11 11 
II non-
" " 
asimilar 2-category diagram could be constructed also for Meinong (Objekte 
and Objektive). Cf. Babb.el, 1960.] 
We can now proceed to the comparison of Wittgenstein's account of the 
simple configuration of the Sachverhalt with Herbart's conception of serial com-
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,. :;..:nbin.ation: what is the model which underlies Herbart's theory, which would 
corr:~spond to the Wittgensteinian metaphors of chain-linkages (2.03) and satur-
.;:~ion? We must remember that Herbart conceives the reals themselves after the 
r-attern of geometrical points (not e.g. machine parts fitting into each other). 
Thus there can be no question that their combination can involve any ineinander 
' ~g~ a la Tractatus. Herbart's account of the 'combination' of reals involves 
rather an appeal to the notion, given currency by the physics of Newton, of 
.. 
action at a distance. In fact we are treated to a description of the relation-
ship between the reals as resting on a kind of quasi-gravitational or quasi-
magnetic attraction and repulsion. In virtue of the existence of what might be 
conceived as a 'field of force' amongst the reals, certain ,combinations or 
1 alliances 1 are formed between compatible reals, against the repelling forces 
of other, incompatible reals.• 
That this ld.nd of 'mechanical union' exists amongst reals is almost all that 
can be said within the strictly ontological sphere of Herbart's philosophy. 
We can go further., to provide, in particular, an explanation of how an object-
ive material world arises, only when we move from the province of ontology to 
• I am not adequate to the task of distinguishing""what might be, from the modern 
point of view, the philosophical working parts in such accounts. It seems lamen-
table that Harbart scholarship has waned to the extent that it has, and this is 
almost certainly the result of a historiographical simplification - that '19th 
century German philosophy' = 'Hegelian idealism' - introduced originally merely 
for pedagogical purposes. (Compare the account of British philo~ophy as 'Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume• - at the expense of e.g. Reid, Brown, and Hamilton). Perhaps the 
mo5t that I can hope for, from· the present remarks,is not that they should throw 
any significant light on Wittgenstein's thought, but that they may rather gener-
ate some modicum of interest in Herbart. We should thus be using the Tractatus 
., 
as a doorway not, indeed, out of but back into a perhaps over-hastily discred-
ited tradition. A comparison of Herbart's thought with that of Bolzano, for example, 
is urgently required if we are fully to understand either philosopher. 
- - ---- --- -· ·-- ·-- - . -- -- .. -·· 
... 
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that of psychology, for it is in virtue of mental activity alone that such 
a world can be said to exist~ The crucial problem, then, is this: how are 
reals, in combination, presented to us in the ways in which they are so presen-
teli? - And here too it is exclusively in terms of specific kinds of machan~:;.' 
combination that the existence of ideas or 'presentations• is to be explained. Far 
- - ·- --·- - . - - - . - . ..... - - ------ --------------
according:.· to Herbart the soul itself is an absolutely simple real, and it 
is the relations in which to stands to other reals (der sich zueinander in 
•• bestimmten Weisen Verhalten) which give rise to our conscious - and 
unconscious - experience. Once again we shall find it useful to present 
Wittgenstein's account of such experience before moving on to give a: ·. ::. 
summary of the Herbartian theoey. 
For Wittgenstein, as for Herbart, we have to distinguish between the·'mezital 
content (thought) and the object-combination which is presented (pictured) 
in that content. Now since eveey thought is itself, for Wittgenstein, a 
combination of simple elements (in virtue of its linguistic articulation), it 
becomes possible for him to conceive the relation between these two entities 
as one of isomorphism, as resting on some complex kind of .ismD:orphic ·ina.pping 
of one .canfiguration: . of absolute simples onto the other"~ '·.::: . . As we shall 
r . - --
see, this account rests, in the end, on Wittgenetein 1 e . mS:jO!" . aehievement~--, .. 
*The experienced world or 'objective semblance' is thus, in the terminology 
of Ingarden (1964/65; cf. also Smith,~), a higher-order intentional object 
founded upon the autonomous totality of reals. 
••I have not yet discovered examples of this mode of expression in Herbart's 
writings, but it does occur, for example in Lotze. 
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his theory of logical operations.!* Wittgenstein divides configurations, first 
of ~.:, into simple and complex. To simple configurations (~hverha1te) we shall 
l':M.ve to return below, but suffice it here to say (i) that we have a determinate 
method for establishing isomorphism of two simple configurations - effectively 
by drawin3 lines connecting the elements of one with the elements of the other, 
and (:ii) that we are to conceive it as being possible to develop a (Principia-
style, identity-fr~e) world-mirroring, formal language whose atomic formulae 
• would themselves be simple configurationso The nature of complex .configurations 
(Tatsache) Wittgenstein now explains as follows: atomic formu1ae can be compound-
ed together, by means of logical operations, to yield complex formulae. Thus we 
shall be able to provide an account of the isomorphism (picturing relationship) 
between complex propositions and complex configurations (facts),(and thereafter 
also of the isomorphisms between thoughts and propositions and between thoughts 
and facts, between sentences (Satzzeichen) and propositions and between sentences 
and facts, and so on),if we can generalise the notionsof logical operation and 
logical compounding to apply not merely to linguistic formulae but to simple 
configurations in general. That such a generalisation is indeed possible is 
shown by demonstrating (i)that the application of '1ogical operations''to simple 
configurations can be shown to involve an appeal simply'·to the totality 
.Nowhere in the Tractatus does Wittgenstein state that atom~c formulae (Elementar-
stttze) are Sachverhalte as is assumed here in the text. He does however seem to 
be committed to the weaker statement that such formulae can be put into isomorph-
ism with Sachverhalte, which will prove sufficient for our purp~.ses. 
••The theory of logical operations was not, of course, original with Wittgen-
stein: see item 'Operation' in Appendix II; what ~ origina1 was the underlying 
extensionalism, with its consequences e.g. iij. the &las· of probabili_ty theory, 
ethics, philosophy of religion, etc. 
------ - - --- ----· - - --- - - ------ ·- - - ------ ---
of all possible combinations of the results of applying the functors 
das Bestehen von and das Nichtbestehen von 
to the totality of Sachverbalte, and (ii) that these functors have in turn 
a satisfactory intuitive meaning within the framework of our ontology, corres-
ponding, respectively to the existence of the simple configuration in question, 
and to the non~existence of that configilration. Thus we obtain the units, the 
... 
'logical' combination of which yields the whole of the 2nd tier of 9rganisation. 
It is this two-tier structure of simple and complex configurations (~-
verhalte and ~atsachen) which makes it possible for Wit~genstein to give an 
account, in the Tractatus, of the 'higher mental processes' .. (that is to say, 
an account of the logical order of our thinking activity) which explains, at the 
same time, how even highly compound thoughts can preserve a relationship to the 
underlying cembinations of element~y objects. Herbart, too, defends such a two-
tier structure, • but in a way . whi.:Oh provides us wit~: n6 adequate theory 
- - -· - . - . 
of the(logic~)order of our thoughts; indeed for almost 100 years after Her-
bart's Psychologie,experimental psychologists were unable to account, within t.\-.e.\r 
theories, for mental activity more complex than ~ensation, rote memory, and 
logical 
simple associative thought; until the/double-tier approach was introduced (by Mei-
nong and Husserl- and by Selz, to whom we shall turn below) only a few years 
before the publication of the Tractatus. 
We must now attempt to assemble together the details of Herbart's theory of 
presentation that we may achieve thereby an adequate estimation of his philos-
*This is discussed briefly in the section which follows. 
or '.ico.l importance. The soul is, we ~aid, an absolutely simple ·real. However, 
i..rt v:~'...rtue of its manifold connections with other reals it becomes possible 
t~ conceive it as being itself subject to a manifold of temporally changing 
determinations, called 'ideas' or 'presentations'. We might say that what is 
';1::·,,,.c ·:;~q;;erienced "16 mi'1.ifold1when the soul is conceived in its relation to 
other reals,has to be viewed as a ~gle absolutely simple, eternal (or better: 
timeless) act-as~ .f!g swoop - when the soul is conceived in abstraction from 
such relations. We shall shortly be able to dispense with this latter mode 
of conception of the soul, since, as Herbart quite rightly points out, the 
soul as a real is absolutely inaccessible to our experiences,which are confined 
exclusively to the objective semblance. ~ut we should first of all indicate the· 
crucial role in Herbart's theory which is played by the assmnption of the 
absolutely simple soul-real in manifold combination with other, external reals. 
For it becomes hereby possible simultaneously to provide a solution to two 
crucial problems which had bedevilled the British empirical psychologists, 
particularly Hume, to whom Herbart is otherwise in so many respects related~ 
These were (i) to accou..'1.t for the unity of the mind (of the sequencesof 
impressions and ideas~amongst which we can dis~over no· unifying term which 
we could label as the 'self'), and (ii) to account for the 'contact' btltween·:each 
individual soul and the surrounding world, ilicluding other individuals. The 
unity of the mind is accounted for, of course, by the fact that what, from one 
point of view, appears as manifold is, in reality, absolutely (J.ne and simple. 
And.·'contact' likewise is accounted for by the fact,that given the presentation 
of sanething which is manifold,this can only be in virtue of the existence of 






analytically, within Herbart's theory, to the assumption of plurality. Solipsism 
is, as we shal.l see, absolutely impossible for the Herbartian. 
It is by now clear that for Herbart there ia, .in the world of appearance, 
no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas (cf. 5.631-641). 
In this sense therefore the Herbartian subject,along with all other reals, lies 
at the limit of the world,where its nature is and forever remains totally un-
... 
known. What there is in the world (in the objective semblance) is mental 
experience and the material world which is presented thereby. Intuitively 
we are to think of each and every experience as resting on the attraction and 
repulsion of vast numbers of reals in contact with the soul-real, the vast 
number of ideas thereby generated forming series which interweave, both amongst 
themselves and amongst other idea-groups previoµsly established in the mind, 
these latter groups enabling us to make sense of the newly introduced ideas, 
yielding associative mem01"'experiences, etc. 
What now is the nature of the connection which exists between the ideas or 
presentations generated in this way? Presentations may, first of all, be 
,. 
exactly alike: as two successive ideas of an identfcal red. In such cases the 
two ideas fuse or coalesce into one single idea. They may, seoondly, be 
ideas 
entirely contrary: as an idea of red and an idea of green. If two such/ atta:npt 
immediate 
to establish themselves in the mind at a single instant there is an/ tendency 
for them to exclude or inhibit· each other. Finally we have . the (typical) case 
where ideas are disparate but compatible: for example an idea of green and an 
idea of hard. In these cases the ideas form combinations or complexes . 
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ln investigating those ideas which may thus 'complicate' with each other 
;o form complexes, Herbart arrives at the notion of a qualitative continuum; 
for example~the continua of colours, of tastes, of sounds, of hardnesses, and 
so on. Two elements from the same qualitative continuum can combine --0nly 
arrest' 
pa...~ially, in a Dl8ll.Il~J'.' __ :which involves what Herbart calls'f'usion -~th/. Elements 
from different qualitative continua can, given appropriate environing conditions, 
.. 
unite in a single time-instant to form a complex, for example the complex 
of ideas which is my present perception of this coloured, moving fleck before 
me. Typically our experience consists of many interweaving series of ideas, 
complicated together (i.e. forming complexes, the elements of which belong to 
different qualitative continua) and interrelating in a variety of different 
ways. (Cf. Stout, 1888, p. 20 and e.g. the remark on p.13: 
According to Herbart, every sen:a.tion, however simple it may appear, 
is due to the fusion of innumerable homogeneous components, which are 
given suocessi:rely in the minute di.visions of time during which the 
external stiinulus operates). 
However, Herbart's most important contribution to our contemporary mode of 
thought rests not on his accounts of the ordering of such mental activity..-nor 
indeed on his account of the relationship between 'inneri and 'outer' (mental 
and material) combination among reals,to which we shall have to turn below. 
It rests, rather, upon his use of mathematics in the study of the m::l.nd, in 
particular of the differential calculus(which deals, of course·, with variations 
which are continuous). Herbart provided, indeed, the philosophical tools for 
mathematical baulked 
the/solution of a problem which had hitherto/philosophers and mathematicians 
alike: how is it possible that, in a world consisting of discrete elements -
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which were, in Herbart's case , ·absolutely simple, immutable rea1s ,- the · 
appearance of continuous variation may arise (in space,time and _ · 
in each of the qualitative continua distinguished by Herbart)? Herbart in 
fact developed an elaborate theory of continua as intellectual fictions ~ 
~ the objective semblance and corresponding only indirectly to determinations 
in the real world. Thus the two spheres (the objective semblance and the 
.. 
world of rea1s) have different mathematical structures. Given Herbart's 
work in this field, together with the constant stress in his writings on the 
concepts of 1manifoldS•, 'spaces•, 'dimensions', •orders•, one is tempted to 
make out a case for ascribing to Herbart (and his followers throughout central 
Europe) a quite unique role in determining the intellectual conditions which 
made possible, for example, non-Euclidean geometry, Einstein's relativity 
theory, Ma.chian sensationalism, perhaps even Freud's tripartite theory of the 
• d • min • 
Finally we must sketch, briefly, some aspects of the account which Herbart 
supplies of the 'presenting' relation between series and complexes of ideas 
4 
on the one hand and objects in the world of appearance on the other. The 
ultimately 
determinations on each side/rest, as we have seen, on combinations of reals, 
•The most influential and the most distinguished agent in all of this was cer-
tainly the mathematician li.emann, a devoted follower of .Herbart, who ascribes 
to his philosophical mentor an essential role in his invention of the general 
theory of (discrete and continuous) manifolds, the theory.which lies at the 
- -----
core of Ce.g.) relatirlty physics.(See the introductory par~graphs·of Riemann's 
1854, and the discussion in my 1976, § 13) o Note that although Herbart almost 
certainly acquired the term 'Mannigfaltigkeit' from Kant, the theory which he 
presented was original with him: Kant's theory of manifolds excludes the possib-
ility of mathematical treatment. 
3-8 
Y12t we may rightly demand, in a philosophically adequate account of-•ntal: expe~-
.---· 
1e:1ca, something more than a merely mechanical account of interrelatiQDs;among 
".;/:l.e -rea1s • The crucial additional factor which Herbart supplies is a recog-
nition of the fact that each presentation can be conceived from two points of 
-
view: either (i) as activity, - the presentation as subjected to mechanical 
~nt~~~~tion w:i.+,h other presentations, - or (ii) in abstraction from its rela-
·tions with other presentations. Under the first aspect the presentation is 
something which b~longs to the subject matter of empirical psychology (a species 
of IT.echa.nics, for Herbart): e.nd from this point of view presentations may 
1 conf1.ict•, may 'coalesce' and so on. Under the second aspect, however, the 
presentation - or •concept' - belongs to the subject-matter of logic; for from 
this aspect we are interested exclusively in the content of the idea, and not 
in any contingent situations in which it may have come to be actualised. From 
this point of view presentations or concepts are 'contrary', •equivalent•, •com-
plementary•, etc.• Unfortunately we are not yet able to carry this forward 
in such a way as to provide a complete ~ccount of the Herbartian theory of pre-
sentation. 
Instea~ we wish to sketch some of the relations between Herbart and Leibniz, 
relations which may prove more immediately relevant in a Tractarian context. 
As we shall see, a comparison between Herbart's atomism and Leibniz's monadology•• 
;yields an initial temptation to conceive Wittgenstein as through and through a 
Herbartian thinker. For Leibnizian monads are absolutely incapable of foming 
.... , ... •O O P L- -
combinations: the monads are windowless. And secondly we are to imagine each 
monad as having been 'set going• (like a clock, in pre-established synchrony 
with all other clocks), and as thereafter being cognitively active: the monad 
is a subject which thinks. In all of these respects Herbart puts ·forward 
•A complete version of these notes would need to . in~~udo a discussion of 
Herbart's activity/content opposition as this affected both Husserl (in his 
1891 and 1900/01) and, - through Herbart's theory of number - Frege: cf. 1884,p.iii. 
••A comparison which is to be found frequently in the literature of 19th century 
Austrian philosophy. 
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an·. opposing view to that of Leibniz, one which seems, at each 
point, to draw him closer to the Tractatus. Thus Herbart's reals are capable 
of linearly combining with each other, and it is such linear combination alone 
which yields all materia1 determination and all change (all •sosein und 
Geschehen•, 6.41) and which constitutmthe world as we experience it (the 
. - ··- ----
_Objective semblance). ]\\rther Herbart's soul is not a subject which thinks: 
like every other real it lies beyond the limits of the world of appearance 
in which w~ (apparently) live and think. Its exclusive function (as a hyp-
othetical entity, within the theory) is to guarantee the unity which char-
acterises the mental experiences of a given subject by serving a~ the common 
term in all of the serial combinations which constitute those mental exper-
iences. 
We can bring out the parallels between Herbart's and Wittgenstein's ontologies 
by means of the following diagram: 
WITTGENSTEIN HERBART 
totalities of 
Gedanken of each 
subject (pictur-
ing facts) 
_ _J__.i--------=7'-,~~----+.-J._:totalities of combin-
ations of reals yielding 
lt......::..-+-11.l::'resentati"ons (~or each 
totality of all 






of the world 
individual SUbJeCt) 
totality of all 





the (real) world 
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:·.11 of wli..ich suggests that the I official I ontology of the Tractatus (that 
wrr'..~h is expressed in _the course of paragraphs 1 to, say, 5.32) should be 
' l assifi ed as essentially Herbartian in nature. But there is a second •un-
official' ~ntology in the Tractatus, which can be gleaned from certain pas-
sages scattered through the paragraphs which remain: this is the ontology of 
solipsism. Something i'urther which is first developed by Wittgenstein in 
these paragraph& is the concept of language - the logically adequate (formal"?) 
language referred to above- as a mirror of the world. This is a concept which 
same 
hfJ.S highly pre-Kantian roots, and when we discover that the flnirroring relation 
is also applied by Wittgenstein to his ('unofficial') accoUn.t of the relation-
ship between the ~' or microcosm, and the world, then it lies close at 
hand to seek an interpretation of this second ontology within a Leibnizian 
. . 
framework. For we shall remember that Leibniz's monads, though windowless, 
yet mirror~ universe , each from its own particular perspective. 
Thus we might say that within the official ontology it is the totalit;y; 
of facts which is taken as primary, that language is seen as ontologically 
derivative in relation to that totality*, and that finally the individual 
.-
totalities of thoughts are in turn derivative of language, since it is exclus-
ivelyin virtue of their linguistic (logical) articulation that they acquire 
their status as thoughts at all (and not, e.g., in Virtue of their satisfying 
•Language is'derivative'in the sense that linguistic entities are all of them 
seen as being primarily particular facts, and or.ly secondarily· as being char-
acterisable ~~linguistic". Note the extent to which language is conceived 
ontologically by Wittgenstein (e.g. at 4.001). 
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some psychological criterion). 
In the unofficial ontology,in contrast, it is !!!l thoughts ~ which 
are ontologically primary. However, in consequence of my understanding of 
a world-mirroring language (5.62),the world and all its objects are recovered -
but they have an ontologically 'weaker' status; in the terminology of Ingarden 
they are merely intentional correlates of my linguistic acts. (See §§ 50-53 
... 
of my 1976). Thus the diagrammatic representation of the unofficia1 
ontology is, as we should expect, identical with that of the official ontology 
- except that now different regions have acquired different ontological 
· weights: in particular one specific thought-totality is picked out as enjoying 
a privileged ontological status in relation to the remaining thought-totalities 
and indeed to the totality of all remaining facts • 
. But all of this throws what is,admittedly, 'Tery little light on the claim 
that in the unofficial ontology :it is my thoughts alone which are ontologically 
primary. We might come margir..ally closer to an understanding of this claim 
if we investigate the role which is played by the underlying atoms/monads 
in the two ontologies which ·..;e have distill"guished-.- We remember that in the 
Herbartian ontology it becomes possible to distinguish individual mental exper- . 
iences of the soul only when the latter is conceived in the light of its combin-
ations with other reals outside it. Only in the context of such combinations 
does the soul 'have presentations' at all, for conceived in isolation it is an 
absolutely simple entity. Solipsism - the view that the individual soul alone 
exists - is thereby absolute:!..y excluded within the Herbartian framework, for in 
the absence of other reals it becomes meaningless to ascribe to the soul any 
~lffe~ at alll pluralism is built into the very foundations of Herbart's thought. 
~h.e~ ~e enter the Leibnizian framework, in contrast, we feel almost obligated, 
gtven the existence of a single self-contained, windowless, world-mirroring monad, 
~o .·egard anything outside the self thus isolated as ontological notsam. The 
·orld thereby shrinks to a point without extension, leaving the reality, coordinated 




j~ ~here have been recent attempts in the literature (see e.g. Bartley, 1974, 
in ~articular as aids to the widerstanding of Wittgenstein~s philosophical 
development. It therefore seems incumbent upon us that we turn our attention 
brief1.y to this aspect of Herbart's thought. We must note, first of a11, 
the extent to which one-sided and over-simplistic preconceptions have 
coloured the estimation of Herbart in very many spheres. Thus when 
psychologists have turned to Herbart they have sought to extract his 1properly 
psychological' thought from wha~ they regard as alien metaphysics, and the 
picture which thereby results is often one of Herbart merely as an associat-
ionistic thinker. We have seen, however, tha~it is precisely the juxta-
position of metaphysical (better: ontological) aspects (atoms, in combination, 
yielding an objective world of determination and change) with psychological 
aspects (atoms, in combination, yielding perceptions of objects in 
VJ:ry 
that objective wor~d) which lends his thought its interest. For thiS/JUXta-
• position of ontology and psychology came to characterise so much of sub-
•or the related juxtaposition of ontology and logico-semantics (401121) 
.. 
sequent 'Austrian' philosophy (see e.g. Meinong, ed. 19o4 ". and Findlay, 1963,p.7). 
· It is precisely such a one-sided, psychological picture of Herbart to 
which appeal is made by Bartley when he puts forward an account of 
the development of Wittgenstein's thought ••• as that of an amateur 
child p.s;,·::hol.:.igist tm'ning - partly as a result of his experience in 
~cnc~lt~~~h:L.~g - from an essentially associationist psychology to a con-
.figuraticri.ism or contextualisrr: close to that of the Gestaltists. 
(1974a, p;309). 
Before turning to correct the picture of Herbart in all of this - when ~e 
shall find that there is a case to be made for regarding Herbart himself as 
~ving defended a 'configurationism or contextualism close to that of the 
Gestaltists' - it will be well if we indicate two fUrther , independent 
simplifications, the correction of each of which does something to undermine 
Bartley's - surely baseless· - conception of a sudden break in Wittgenstein's 
thirJdng. 
There is, first of all, no evidence of anyinterest in child psychology on 
Wittgenstein's part before the publication of the Tractatus. There is however 
ample evidence of an interest in theoretical psychology during this period, 
(indeed, I hope to show in a fUture paper that already within the 
Tractatus we can discern certain core ideas of Gestalt psychology-at least 
in the embryo form in which this had been anticipated by Ehrenfels, acknow-
ledged father of the discipline, in his 1890). And secondly, a key role is assigned 
by Bartley to the psychologist Karl Btthler, whose theories ~e related to those of 
the Austrian .3chool reform movement (in which Wittgenstein was peripherally 
to 
involved)on the one hand and/Wittgenstein's later, 'contextualist.' :philosophy 
on the other. Because of his preconcoption.of a radical change in Wittgenstein's 
\-lilou..g.r.·.~. , however, Bartley fails to draw certain important conclusions from the 
~ c~ .,;, >at already before the war BUhler had done important work in the study of 
.;.;:· · -::;eless thought 1 , work which served as a foundation for his later theorising 
:!.n the field of child psychology. (Cf. Bartley, 1974,p.105). 
~ - · - ------- -
~/u.:.. ·iilg the first d.::cade of this century BUhler had been a leading member of 
;; '1e :i.nfiuential WUrzburg school of experimental psychology, and as such he had 
spr1n1g to fame amongst experimental psychologists through the controversy in 
which he had engaged with Wundt,.after the latter had savagely criticised the 
Wttrzburg experimental methods(which rested crucially on a rigorous process of 
intro~pection). Along with August MesseriBUhler had done much .to improve the 
philosophical foundations of WUrzburgian psychology by :ilnporting concepts 
derived from the work of Edmund Husserl, especially from the latter's Logical 
Invest:gations. (As with G. Husserl's account of legal facts discus~ed above 
and with Reinach's Sachverhalt ontology~scussed in.! and~ so here we can 
discern important parallels between the work of BUhler and .the Tractatus. 
Parallels of this sort can be accounted for, it seems, only on the basis 
of a recognition of the extent to which the latter is a work enjoying manifold 
relations to the Meinong-Husserl-Stumpf philoso;hical ontology.) . Anticipations 
of Tractarian ideas in the works of the WUrzburg school (discussed in § 8 below) 
have a quite specific philosophical relevance since if it can be ·shown in detai~: . 
that it is possible to read the Tractatus against ~ background - the background 
of KUlpe, Marbe, Messer, the early Btthler and (especially) Selz-- then it becomes 
point of view, 
clear that,at least from one/ the account of thinking which is inherent in it 
is by no means so inadequate as has subsequently been supposed - not .least by 
Wittgenstein himself o First of all, however, we must return to Herbart• 
According to Bartley, Herbart's theory of the mind is a 'bucket or tub 
theory' (1974a, p.309). Thus whilst recognising that Herbartian ideas may 
themselves be active, he claims that 
they lead their lives in passive storehouse minds. To a Herbartian, 
whose aim above all is moral education, teaching consists in feeding 
students those ideas which it has been decided should dominate their 
lives. (~.cit.) 
He goes on~to stress the emphasis on rote-learning, on discipline, on non-
originative teaching and strict adherence to 'method books-' in Habsburg educ-
ational practice. It is not clear to me the extent to which this account in-
volves a running together of Herbartian theory with the Austrian ~ Policy 
of which the theory was employed as an instrument.* Suffice it to say,in 
defence of Herbart, that from the pedagogical point of view the schools of 
Austria were, as Bartley himself admits, the envy of Europe. 
What is more important is that we should examine Bartley's account of the 
Herbartian conception of the mind, for here it is clear that talk of 'passive 
storehouses' is quite inappropriate. For whilst the mind (the totality of 
ideas or presentations) within the Herbartian framework is indeed 'passive' 
~ 
from one point of view, yet, in virtue of the activity of the ideas themselves 
it comes to enjoy a highly complex organisation, and Herbart's accounts of this 
organisation are often reminiscent of Freud who may, indeed, have been influenced 
by them. Moreover this complex organisation yields an analogue of self-deter-
mination and self-will in the developed mind (discussed by Stout, 1888, pp.43-
50) 9 --- the •storehouse' is not therefore 'passive•. 
•Thus one of the consequences of Herbartian theory is that rote-learning 
should actually be abandoned, in favour of techniques of learning by assoc-
46 
.\11 ideas arise , we saw , in virtue of combinations of reals (com-
and 
· -i,r:,a tions, in fact, of · external/ bodily reals with the soul) • The ideas 
~.ttract and repulse each other, coalescing or forming complexes or inhibiting 
each other according to the extent to which their natures SD! alien or compat-
.u . :.Le. It is this generative and inhibitive activity which constitutes the 
stre8m of mental experiences with which we are all of: us familiar. Herbart 
... 
now demonstrates how, in virtue of the -' mutual conflict of incompatible ideas, 
comes to be 
the idea-totality of a given subject / divided into two sub-totalities, those 
of which we are conscious and those which are, at any given time, below the 
'threshold' of consciousness. Ideas can securely cross this threshold, in effect, 
only to the extent that they can form alliances with other ideas, already 
present in consciousness,(from which we can draw certain immediate pedagogical 
consequences; for example that the teacher should offer new idea-material to 
the pupil only when this new material has been somehow made accessible to 
the latter through chains of compatible ideas concluding in ideas with which 
he is already familiar.) 
How, now, do these remarks relate to Wittgenstein? ~~ was stated above (p.31) 
that Herbart, like Wittgenstein, had developed a two-tier account of the 
combination of reals (combination which yields the mental experience of each 
subject on the one hand, and the objective semblance on the other). So far 
we have discussed only simple ('linear') combination within the Herbartian 
framework, and we have seen something of how such linear canbinations give 
rise to aerial orderings (e.g. of space and time). At this point 
47 
- ·-· 
... . . ·. 
however we must proceed to give an account of the second tier of •combination•, 
a type of higher-order bonding-together which comes into being exclusively 
within the mental sphere. Indeed its function within Herbart's theory is 
precisely to explain the order in that sphere, without appeal to any subject 
which thinks, nor te any mythological faculties of reason or 1.mderstanding • 
... 
In the Tractatus, of course, this order is explained also by appeal to a 
second tier of combination, yielding the space of Tatsachen,the logical 
order of which characterises also each sub-space of mental Tatsachen or 
thoughts, as well as the sub-space of linguistic Tatsachen. We might therefore 
anticipate that, just as the lower type of combination in Herbart corresponds 
to Sachverhalt configuration in the Tractatus, so also Herbart's higher type 
of mental combination might correspond to something recognisable as Wittgen-
steinian Tatsachen. We find however that logically complex judgments are 
conceived, by Herbart, in terms of just the same kind of attractive combination 
amongst ideas which accounts for mental experiences of simpler types. A 
radically new kind of organisation amongst mental entities is encountered, iri 
... 
fact, only when we move up to a much higher level, to a level which corresponds 
in Wittgensteinian terms not to individual thoughts but to complete forms 
of life. 
A conception of the mind as a contourless 'bucket or tub' , into which enter 
myriad series of reals. (resulting, e.g. from sense-perception or from 
physiological disturbances) seems to preclude an answer to ~he question: how 
is disciplined thought possible? It seems that mental experience would be 
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e,o.D .i':!.ned exclusively to sensual and emotional elements accompanied, at most, 
h ::. kind of inner babbling, resulting from what Herbart ca11a 'the un-
(10ntrolled play of the psychological mechanism• and which, as Stout reports, 
'-ls to be found in the most striking form in children and uneducated persons• • 
v·iov0, p.32).. If ordered thought is to be possible ,then there must be certain 
connections amongst some of the ideas or presentations in the mind - correspond-
ing, on the levei of content, to (e.g.) logical connections - which are not 
subject to transient disturbances by the entry of new ideas, but· which rather 
serve as a conceptual network in terms of which those new ideas, deriving, eog., 
from sensory experience, acquire their meaning for the subject in question. 
The totalities of ideas connected together in this way Herbart called present-
i\,tign-massea. As Stout expressed it: 
The uncontrolled play of the psychological mechanism gives place to 
disciplined thinking, in so far as presentation-masses come into being 
which are reinstated and maintained in consciousness without lasting 
or important modification from extraneous conditions, because their 
mode of reproduction is determined mainly and ultimately by the 
internal connexion of their components • ( 1888, p.32). 
such presentation- or idea-masses arise when,through long association with a 
large number of similar ideas (ideas which have a tendency to fuse together 
and thereby to attract further, related ideas to a slowly growing whole) a 
large number of complex interweaving· connections is established which bind 
together, in.: a variety of mutually supporting ways, a complete and relatively 
self-sufficient idea-fabric. It is the presence of such presentation-masses 
in the miri.d which determines, for example, the ideas which shcill be inhibited 
at the threshold of consciousness. And it is the individual presentation-
mass which determines, to a large extent, the combinations of new ideas which 
enter the mind, and therefore also the aspects in which the objects presented 
by those ideas are given. Thus one and the same object will be perceived 
differently by subjects with different presentation-masses, since ideas of 
those objects will enter each mind in such a way as to fit into quite different-
ly structured surrounding contexts of compatible ideas. And what applies 
to the perception of objects applies also to the imderstandmg of language and 
to the gra9ping of concepts. 
A Worcestershire peasant, a Yarmouth fisherman, a · London policeman, 
a West-end gourmet, a member of the Fishery board, an evolutionist 
philosopher, and a primary school boy have all concepts of crab; 
. -
but could these concepts be actualised• the ·results would be start-
lingly unalike ••• How then are we to know what a crab is, how decide 
which of these queer concepts is legitimately entitled to the name 
it claims~ (Adams, 1897, P• 182) 
As Frege, or Wittgenstein might have put it: 
Only in the nexus of a presentation-mass does a name have meaning. 
Indeed context-principles of this form occur quite frequently in the writings 
of .Herbart's followers (see, e.g. Adams, 1897, p.180) - and perhaps also 
the contextualism of the Viennese philosopher Wilhelm Jerusalem (see Appendix 
III, below) may have to be understood i~ this light. (We may mention also 
the contextua1ist writings of w. Schapp, see e.g. his 1953 and Schmidt, 1967). 
0 This is not to suggest however that there is typically only one presen-
tation mass executing its organisatory function in the developed human mind. 
Rather: 
In the course of a varied experience many distinct masses are 
formed connected with special localities and occupations, such as 
the church• the theatre, the office, the garden, the chess-board, 
and the like. (Stout, cn.cit.,p.33). 
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~g. Between Meinong•s Grazer Schule,Ehrenfels, Husserl and Stumpf on 
b'he. cne hE.nd and the Gesta1t psychology proper of Wertheimer, Keb1er and Koffka 
there ·arose a school of experimental psychologists -· · ·: ~ -·:: 
s~. Southern Germany which exerted a wide influence on the thought of the period, 
not only in the German-speaking world but also in England and -·" ::liJ.·.. America 
{e'3pecially in Titchener's institute at Cornell). This was the Wtlrzburg school, 
fcu21d~d by Oswald Kttlpe, someone whom we have already met as a· correspondent of 
.. 
Alexander in Manchester. 'WUrzburg psychology was perhaps the most determined 
at-tempt to carry through in an'" experimenta1 way the Herbartian irogramnie . according 
to which it is the ideas of the mind which must form the direct subject-matter 
of tlie science of psychology. Before KUlpe experimenta1 psychologists had found 
a great deal of success in applying their accepted methods to perception, to 
and 
feelings and emotions, ,A;o simple association of ideas, but the higher mental 
processes,of thinld.ng, reasoning, judging, remembering, had not proved amenable 
to any standard , .. laboratory treatment. KUlpe and his followers developed, 
in the first decade of this century, a series of ingenious methods by means of 
which such higher mental processes could be brought within the scope of exper-
imental investigation, but they were methods which caused a great deal of 
~ 
controversy throughout the closely-knit world of experimental psychology because 
of their revolutionary and - to those used to cruder associatiord.irtic techniques 
- highly dubious character. 
In the first work of the WUrzburg group, published in 1901 by 
Mayer and Orth,the centra1 experiment was set up as follows: each of 
a small group of highly' trained, highly articulate subjects was given a stimulus 
word and asked to describe everything which occurr~d in his mind in response to 
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the word. Sometimes images occurred,(eogo to the word •cat' an image of some 
specific cat), sometimes acts of will occurred (e.g. in response to a stimulus 
word for some desir~ble object). Sometimes the subjects reported that images of 
words additional to the stimulus word were present in the mind. But it was 
discbvered also that a further group of contents Of consciousness were repeatedl1 · 
found to be present. A~ the experimenters themselves report: 
In the course of our experiments we were, again and again, involuntarily 
brought up against the fact of the existence of this third group. The subjec 
frequently reported that they experienced certain events of consciousness 
which they could quite clearly designate neither as definite images nor 
yet as volitions. For example, the subject Mayer made the observation that, 
in reference to the auditory stimulus-word "metre" a peculiar event of con-
sciousness intervened which could not be characterized more exactly, and 
which was succeeded by the spoken response "trochee". In other cases, the 
subjects could give a closer account of these psychic facts. For example, 
Orth observed that the stimulus word "mustard" released such a peculiar 
event of consciousness, which he thought he could characterize as ''Memory of a 
common figure of speech". Thereafter the reaction "grain" (~) followed. 
In all such cases, the subject could, nevertheless, not detect the slightest 
trace of the presence in consciousness of "presentations" (Vorstellungen) 
by which they specified the psychic fact more exactly in their reports. 
All these events of consciousness, in spite of their obviously, often 
totally, different quality, we class together under the name Bewusstseins-
lagen - states of consciousness. The replies of the observers show that 
these states of consciousness are sometimes marked by feeling, but are, 
however, sometimes without any feeling tone. (Mayer and Orth, 1901, po6).• 
Bewusstseinslagen, then, are imageless thoughts, sometimes with, sometimes 
without an attached feeling tone. 
The second major product of the WUrzburg school was by the psychologist Ko 
published 
Marbe, also/in 1901. It bore the title: Experimental Psychological Investigations 
•• 
of Judgment: An Introduction to Logic. Marbe set himself the task of finding 
out what it was which distinguished those mental acts which ~e acts of judgment 
•as trans. in Humphrey, 1951, p.33. ••Surely we can discern an implicit ref-
erence to works - ~nd titles - such as this at Tractatus 40 1121 0 
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from mental, acts of other typeso (We might say that he was searching for the 
psychologic~l correlate of Frege's 'judgment stroke•). He therefore set his 
subjects various tasks, such as comparing different weights, determining the 
lightest of three greys, or simple arithmetical tasks, each resulting in the 
need to make a determinate judgment. The subjects were then instructed to 
report as precisely as possible everything which took place in their minds 
during the making of this judgment. 
Marbe's conclusion was rather unexpected: he concluded that there are absolutely 
no concomitant events of which it could be said that they lend to judgment its 
character. That is, that there are judgments, recognised on all sides as such, 
with nothing in consciousness to indicate why they are judgments. 
The results of these early papers were therefore, as KUlpe himself pointed 
out (1922, p.309), largely negative: they consisted in the discovery that the 
conventional descriptive terms of experimental psychology were not adequate 
to account for the higher intellectual processes.(See Humphrey, 1951, p.36). 
The next, by now more positive, product of the WUrzburg school appeared in 19o6 
by Messer, a psychologist who played an important role as link man between Husserl's 
phenomenology and experimental psychology. Messer's 224 page paper is ent-
itled''Experimental Investigations into the Psychology of Thought". His 
progranune consisted in developing thought-experiments of such a wide range that 
the supply of examples of Bewusstseinslagen thereby achieved would be sufficiently 
large and heterogeneous to make possible a classification (and eventually also 
a theory) of such states of consciousness, states which had hitherto been regarded 
as being not further analysable. Fourteen different sets of experiments were 
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conducted, including: supply a co-ordinate object to the stimulus-word (e.g. to 
the stimulus · 'hand' , the response ' foot' ) ; supply a coordinate idea ( e. g • 
stimulus •table', response 'furniture•); characterise the idea denoted by the 
stimulus (e.g. flood - 'a great mass of water in movement•); give a relation 
between (two) stimulus-words; express a personal preference between two famous 
men, things, states, etc.; given a noun and adjective, make a judgment including 
both; given a proposition, take up some attitude with respect to it; and so on. 
(See Humphrey, p.38 for a complete list). The first result of Messer's experiments 
was a confirmation of the original conclusion of Mayer and Orth, i.e. that there 
are very many psychic states which involve no images, which are not--except, 
perhaps, in retrospect - verbalisable, and which yet play a determining role in 
the course of our thinking • . Thus Kttlpe, who served as a long-suffering subject 
for nearly all of the WUrzburg experiments, in g::l.ving to the stimulus-word 'horse-
fly' the response 'dragon-fly', could report that the superordinate idea •vermin' 
- though not, be it noted, the~ - was 1clearly present'as a Bewusstseinslage 
as the response was given. (Humphrey, po39). This possibility, that there are 
imageless meaning-elements corresponding to words which are present in the mind 
even in the absence of the words themselves, will have an important role to play 
in oursubsequent arguments concerning the Tractatus. 
Other Bewusstseinslagen distinguished by the WUrzburg group included the 
consciousness of a rule - not the explicit thinking of the rule itself, but 
rather the awareness of the existence of the rule as something which one knows 
can be followed in giving circumstances and which thereby sanctions the passage 
in thought from one situation to another without any explicit reflection about 
the x·elation between the two situations. They included.also the consciousness 
that something is real, that it is lasting a long time, that it is over more 
quickly than expected, that it is the same as what came before, that it is 
compatible with some other thing, that it makes sense, that it is on the tip of 
the tongue, that it will be difficult, that we need not do it, that we are 
ready for it, that we can do it if we try, and so ono (See Findlay, 1955, p.184 
quoting from Titchener~9o;v10,p.50~). 
What now, is the relevance of these investigations to our understanding of 
the T:;:-o.cto.tiiO'; O:ucc- ag~i tl:i.1: read.er musi; be ·satisfied with :Little more than 
hints, until the full philosophical consequences (if any) of the parallels set 
forth here and in ! have been assembled together. Let us recall, first of all, 
the letter which Russell wrote to Wittgenstein asking for a clarification of 
the nature of thoughts (Gedanken) in the Tractatus. Russell had asked Wittgen-
stein what were the constituents of the thought and what was their relation to 
the fact pictured by the thought. Wittgenstein's reply (1974, p.72) was as 
follows: 
I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it 
- -
must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. 
Again the kind of relation of the constituents ·of thought and of the pictured 
fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find it out. 
And again: 
Does a Gedanke consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents that 
have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents 
are I don't know. (My emphasis,here and above). 
As Shwayder concludes (1954, P•77): 
Wittgenstein's 11Gedanken" are not other-worldly "senses" of sentences, but 
the significant sentences themselves. In addition ••• Wittgenstein certainly 
thinks that Thoughts are psychological complexes ••• (p.128:) [an] interp-
retation which will shock many readers and is in need of justification. 
• 
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Further justification adduced by Shwayder includes the discussions of psychology 
.• 
in the Notebooks (W~ttgenstein, 1961, esp.e.g.pp.49,77,80,82,85,96) and the fact 
that 
Wittgenstein in his later writings continually returns to the criticism 
of the view that there has to be a mental process or entity of some kind 
behind all intellectual activities, and he does this with the energy of one 
actuated by the devil of self-criticism (Shwayder, .2E.•cit., po129). 
The next and - in virtue of the controversy which it sparked with Wundt and the 
n.::;sociationist school - probably the most notQI"ious work of the WUrzburg 
school \'ras carried out by Karl BUhler, a philosopher-psychologist whom we have 
already met in our discussion of Bartley's account of Wittgenstein's development 
above. We said there that BUhler had already, before the conception of the 
Tra.ct~tus, published important work in the theory of 'imageless thought' of a 
kin:l which may have relevance to the ideas of Wittgenstein in this periodo For 
BU.hler'u aim, in his Wttrzburg work, was precisely to determine "what are the con-
stituent parts (Bestandsttlcke) of our thought experiences" (quoted by Humphrey ,p.57, 
from BUhler, 1907). The first part of BUhler's work was entitled 11Ueber Gedanken", 
and in it BUhler set himself the task of producing a unified theory of thinking 
which would have none of the character of nzy-st:erious-beast taxonomy which had 
b8en a feature of the earlier Wttrzburg work on Bewusstseinslagen. To this end 
involving complex thinking acts, acts 
he employed experiments/which would reveal the mental processes which have1 in sim-
pler cases1 become mechanised by repetition and thereby rendered unconscious. 
Thus questions were put, to which the subject was to answer 'Yes' or 'No' before 
giving the fullest possible report of his experienceso These questions inc+uded: 
When Eucken speaks of a world-historical apperception,do you khow what he 
means'? 
Can yo11 get to Berlin from here in seven hours? 
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Was Eucke~ right when he said: Even the limits of knowledge cou1d not coml 
tc consciousness, unless Man somehow or other transcended them ? 
Can the ~tomic theOI""J of physics ever be proved untrue by any di • ? 
. scoveries 
The smaller the woman's foot,the larger the bill for the shoes? 
(Quoted by Humphrey, .2E·~· ,p.56). 
BUhl.cr's conclusion from these 
·experiments was, first of all, that 
images which may be present in our consciousness when we think are utterly irrel-
evant to the course of that thinking as such; in this he resembles Frege on the 
one hand, and Reinach and the Wittgenstein of (Shwayder's) Tractatus on the other.• 
Thus in addressing himself to the question as to how the function of carrying 
thought-content is distributed as between lrnages and thoughl.s _,. ... _ .. - --.OW.U.t:J.' - --~..I..- - • w•·..&..,,,.eo. 
A glance at the protocols will tell us: anything so fragmentary, so spora<iic, 
so thoroughly at the mercy of chance when it enters consciousness as the 
images in our thought experiences, cannot be regarded as the carrier of the 
close-fitting and continuous thought-content ••• The thoughts alone can be 
regarded as the real constituent parts of our thought-experiences. (BUhler, 
1907, p. 317 as trans. by Humphrey,pp.57f)o 
BUhler is pointing here to a quite specific psychic realm, a realm with its own 
articulations, articulations which include that type of determinate content 
which had been hitherto disclosed by the WUrzburgers in their studies of Bewusst-
seinslagen, but which include also definite references to the objects of which 
we are thinking. 
There are, says BUhler, Gedanken [i.e. thought-units] in which the object 
of thought is clearly defined in consciousness without any image, or even 
without any consciousness of [a] ru:L.e or of '[a] relationo ••• We must con-
clude that thinking may contain an imageless modification of consciousness 
corresponding to the meaning of the thought. Whatever the meaning, it may 
appear in experience without an imageo We may, in fact, "think" an object 
·s~Q Reinach 1911 and my discussion in B; all of these thinkers affirmed the 
irrelevance of intuitive imagery to thought; Frege however combined this with 
· d t 1 t · t. t. f , a,s enP.;i. ties e:x;istiru; an ina er1ue. e p a onis ic concep ion o thoughts' /\in an 'eternar realm' quite 
3lien, e.g., to the author of the Tractatus. 
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in the external world or an inference involving physical object 
without any "mental" intermediary. (Humphrey 1 s summary, .2E·~·, 
I 
It was not just a terminological advance, then, which was involved in i 
investigation of the thought-units which make up our thinking activity. Ye\ 
there are still certain questions which were lett tmanswered by Btllll.er, ques\ 
such as the manner in which thought-units are bound together, in consciousness, 
and the nature of the_ relationship between the world of thought and the world 
of external reality about which we think. Both of these questions were tackled 
in a fashion which is of great interest to our own present concerns by the last 
senior member of the line of Ktnpe's psychological pupils, Otto Selzn Selz 
(with BUh.ler) 
joined Ktnpe only after the latter had moved from WUrzburg/to take the chair 
of Philosophy in Bom. It must be stressed that before joining KUlpe Selz had 
worked in Munich with the Munich school of phenomenologists, including Reinach 
and Pf!!nder,both of whom had made important contributions to the early pre-
Tractarian Sachverhalt literature (see my~). Selz indeed published a paper 
on Meinongean ontology in the Lipps Festschrift which contained also Reinach's 
ground-breaking''Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils 11 (1911). In 1913 Selz published 
the first volume of a study of the laws of the ordered course of thought ('Uber 
die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlauf a). This work contained one terminological 
~r.d two consequent conceptual advances on the analysis which had been put for-
ward by BUhler. The terminological advance was clearly coloured by his acquain-
tance with the Munich phenomenologists and their Sachverhalt-ontologies, for 
on p.131 of Selz's work we find: 
Stwnpf fUhrte den Ausdruck "Sachverhalt" ein. Wir gebrauchen statt 
dessen den Ausdruck "Sachverh!lltnis", um durch das Wort ''Verhllltnis" 
die eigentUmliche Natur der Sachverh!iltnisse als ein sich zueinander 
in einer bestimmten Weise Verha.lten von bestimmten Gegenst~nden zurn 
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• Au~:;druck zu bringen. 
And the similarity of this passage to , for example, Tractatus 2.03: 
Im Sachverhalt verhalten sich die Gegenstttnde in bestirnmter Art und 
Weise zueinander** 
lends additional support to our arguments in ! sketching possible 
parallels between Selz and the Munich Sachverhalt-ontologists on the one hand 
and Nittgenstein's Tractarian Sachver~-ontology on the other. Selz proceeds, 
after a discussion of Reinach's 1911, to the following detailed characterisation 
of his "Sachverh!tltnisse": 
Sachverhaltnisse sind das in einer bestimmten Beziehung Stehen bestimmter 
Gegenst~nde. In allen Sachverhfil.tnissen k~nnen wir die Gegenstttnde, die in 
der Beziehung stehen, und die in verschiedenen Sachverhlfl.tnissen der gleich-
en Art verschieden sind, und die Beziehung, in der sie stehen, die in allen 
Sachverh!!ltnissen der gleichen Art dieselbe Beziehung ist, unterscheiden. 
Sachverhttltnisse sind aber kein Aggregat aus den Gegenstttnden und der Be-
~ichung, in der sie stehen, und setzen sich auch nicht aus ihnen zusammen 
1.,rie ein Ganzes aus seinen Teilen, sondern das in einer bestirnmten Beziehung 
Stehen ist nicht nur eine in ei.n Nebeneinander anderer Gegebenheiten nicht 
restlos auflHsbare, also in diesem Sinne einheitliche Gegebenheit, sondern 
einc einheitliche Gegebenheit besonderer Art, und zwar ist es keine selbst-
~ndige Gegebenheit, vielmehr sind Sachverh.Ultnisse Mi.tgegebenheiten, die 
i:i der Natur anderer Gegenstt!nde, bezw. einer gegebenen Gegenstandsordnung 
begrUndet sind. ( P• ~ 42, Selz' s emph<.rnis). 
':;e ~;aid that this chcmge of terminology corresponded to a two-fold. change 
of c:~~proach. Selz had asked himself how the thought-units of the broad type 
discussed by BUhler could unite themselves in a single mental content (or 
' Komplex') as he called it. They unite themselves, Selz asserted, precisely 
in constituting Sachverhfiltnisse, ~ generis relational. wholes, of a type 
•stumpf introduced the term "Sachverha.lt". Instead of this we use "Sachverhl!ltnis", 
in order to express, by means of the word ''V'erh2.ltnis" (relation) ,the pecu1iar 
ruture of the state of affairs as a standing of determinate objects in determinate 
rcl<;_tions to one another. 
·'"In t l~e state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another. 
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quite different from the wholes formed when, say, the associationists' images 
are merely _arranged together, side by side. And Selz could appeal to what 
was by then a very large literature on the logic of Sachverhalte to explain 
how his thoughts, as mental Sachverhttltnisse, could correspond to the logician's 
idealised judgments and propositions.(See Meinong 1910, Husserl 1900/01, Reinach 
1911, and later Hcnecker, 1921). But Selz could appeal also to this same 
literature in order to gather support for his second conceptual advance. For 
Sel~ had noticed that it is Sachverh!fl.tnisse also which constitute the world 
of physical reality,to which our thoughts (normally) relate. Thus what had 
been no more.than a metaphorical parallel between Sachlagen and Bewusstseins-
lagen, the metaphor determining the coinage of the latter term by Orth and 
Mayer, has become, at the hands of Selz, a structural identity: Sachverh!lltnisse 
occur both in the sphere of thought, where they correspond to judgments in 
propositional form, and in the sphere of external reality, where they correspond 
to states of affairs which make such judgments true. Indeed, Selz argues, 
\dthout relational wholes of the former kind, pre-formed structures into which 
of the order ~·.rhich is revealed in our thoughts. Unfortunately it would take 
u~ too far ~field to discuss the details of this aspect of Selz's work. 
'rh/re is, however, one further notion to which appeal is made by Selz which 
merits our attention. In our discussion of Wittgenstein and Herbart we pointed 
to the fact that both philosophers inroduced a two-tier theory of the combinat-
io~ of objects, but that Wittgenstein alone, with his distinction between •atom-
ic' <rnd ';:iolecular' facts, had produced an account which could :promise to be 
ade·:1w.~te to the logical structure of our thinking. Selz, too, appeals to such 
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a two-tier account,one which, for a work published in 1913, has striking paral-
lels to the Tr actatus account of the two tiers of atomic and molecular statal 
combination. According to Selz there are not only simple relational.--wholes 
( einf ache Sa chvcrhttltnisse ) but also composite relational wholes (zusammengesetzte 
So.chverh!tltnisse): 
Unter einem zusammengesetzten Sachverhl!ltnis ist eine Verbindung von 
Sachverhltl tnissen _zu verstehen, die dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, dass 
die in dem Sachverhaltsverband enthaltenen Sachverh!tltnisse Sachverhalts-
glieder oder Beziehungen gemeinsam haben, oder dass Sachverh!tltnisse 
Glieder .::i.nderer Sachverh.!tltnisse sind. (p.143)• 
Simple and composite relational wholes therefore correspond, as Selz points out, 
to si~ple and composite judgments, as distinguished, for example, in the 
Logik of Wundt. Selz recognises also that composite Sachverh.!tltnisse 
are not simply aggregates of constituent simple Sachverhfil tnisse, any more 
than tne i:_,tter could be conceived simply as aggregates of their constituent 
objects s.nd relations; rather 
[die] zusammengesetzte Sachverhlfltnisse sind •••• ebenso wie einfache 
Snchverhltltnisse unzerlegbare Einheiten, die sich aus einer eigen-
tttmlichen Verbindung vcn einfachen Sachverh!tltnissen, also des in 
einer bestimmten Beziehung Stehens von bestimmten Gegenstttnden kon-
,,ti tuieren. (p.145). 
This completes our (provisional) sketch of relations between the '.Practatus 
and th•: experimental psychology and phenomenology of thinking. It is perhaps 
,,:orthwhile to note, in echo of our methodological preamble above, that we are 
not here claiming any direct influence by Selz (or BUhler, or Reinach) on the 
early ',Jittgenstein. But nor, either, is our argument simply of the form: great 
~Thie s~me two-tier account can also be found, of course, in Meinong's theory 
of Objektive (cf. the distinction between Objekt i ve t!ber Ob j ekte and Objekti ve 
Uber Objekt i ve), echoes of which can be found in turn in the first dozen pages 
of -.~i tt[;enstein' s Notebooks ( 1914-16). 
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minds think (in German) alike. Rather we wish to issue reminders of the fact 
thn.t ',..Jittgenstein was, in his early years, working on the fringes of a logical 
and psychological co.:nmunity which took for granted concepts and p:-oblems - and 
terminology - _quite alien to most recent commentators on the Tractatus. And the 
thinkers responsible for shaping this -conceptual framework - besides, eog• Kant, 
Helmholtz and Wundt, - were centrally Herbart, Brentano, Lipps, Meinong, Husserl, 
Sturnpf, :md KUlpe, and their followers in Austria, Germany, and Cambridge. 
S9 , We might appeal, finally, to what is perhaps an important piece of circumstantial 
evidence justifying an eventual allignment of the Tractatus closer to Austrian 
(Meinong) 
ontology/on the one hand and to the experimental psychology of thinking (KUlpe) 
on the other. During his internment a:a a pr~soner-of-war in Monte Cassino 
when,it seems, .the ontology of the ~ctatus was receiving its final shaping, 
Wittgenstein struck up a friendship with a schoolteacher, a certain Dr Ludwig 
H~nsel, later to become Professor at a Viennese grammar school. Wittgenstein 
and H1tnsel for long after remained close friends. It seems to have been ID!nsel 
who convinced Wittgenstein that he should take up schoolteaching like H!!nsel 
himself; and Httnsel made regular visits to Wittgenstein :Ln the villages where 
he taught in the years following the War. Bartley ci:~serts that H.!!nsel, whom he 
describes, somewhat dismissively,as a puritanical Roman Catholic, played a role 
a.kin ta that of spiritual adviser and father confessor to Wittgenstein throughout 
his life, but no ~ention is made of a possible influence by or through Hl!nsel 
on l:Ji t tgenstein' a philosophy. Instead we are referred by Bartley to a work by 
W!nr.;el entitled Die Jugend und die leibliche Liebe (Youth and Carnal Love) (1938) 
\vhich ~~· , ,·L:i..ey describes as a polemical tract against masturbation.(1974,po14f), 
Not having 'yet seen a copy of this tract I cannot judge the veracity of 
Bartley's de&cription; -- we have to remember that there was an important 
tradition of eminently intellectually respectable psychosexual literature in 
Austria , ranging from Freud and Weininger (a favourite of Wittgenstein's through-
out his life), to Ehrenfels' works on polygamy and eugenics. But it seems possible 
tl-..n.t Bartley is less than fair in his treatment of Htlnsel. For there is another, 
not unimpressive work by H!lnsel, published much later - significantly enough 
in the Ehrenfels memorial volume (1960)-a paper entitled "Der Gegenstand des 
tlegriffs und die Logik;•, in which Hl:lnsel reveals a fine sense of the histories 
of philosophy and psychology, a recognition (which echoes Henecker's 1921) of 
the importance of ontology for the study of logic (cf. the reference to Denk-
und Gegenstandslot-?-k on p.176), ~a far from superficial understanding of the 
" . 
.:.r.:;.ct::i.tus. 
)·ihat i;;; most crucial for us in this article is that mmsel lists his 
i::fh~trnces. On p.161 he writes: 
My own road began with Meinong. For essential stimulation I have to 
thank Alois HtHler and F. Weinha.ndl [a successor of Meinong as head of 
--------
'"The ;.rork includes also what is, in effect, a discussion of Frege's Begriffs-
::Jchrift, in which the following diagram 
ist 
i::; employed to illustrate the Fregean notion of saturation. Given a functional 
axprcs.;ion 'f', with which are associated the characteristics (Merkmale) a,b, 
~, and d, then the first pair of circles symbolises some (complete) object x, 
t'.-10 second pair the (incomplete) function f( ) , and the whole diagram the 
(complete) proposition'f(:x:)'. 
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the GrRz Institute of Experimental Psychology ] and a stronger - also a 
more personal - effect was had upon me by Ludwig Wittgenstein.(My trans.) 
From this we can assume - what should be checkable in the records of Graz 
and Vienna Universities - that since H!!nsel lists Meinong first, it was already 
as a student, before meeting Wittgenstein and discussing with him the ideas of 
the l'ractatus that Httnsel had acquired his knowledge of Meinong' s ideas. But 
Htlnsel now goes on, in the same passage, to point out that, in retrospect, he 
sees th::lt the thoughts he had achieved through Meinong' s, Htlfler' s and Witt-
genstein'n influence, he might also have found first of all in the works of 
• Oswald KUlpe and Edmund Husserl. 
:!:·1 the light of these remarks it might be expedient to issue the following 
ch~llengeo In the Preface to the Tractat~ Wittgenstein writes: 
••• what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and 
the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference 
to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by 
someone else. 
I will only mention that I am indebted to Frege' s great •11orks and to 
the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for a large part of the 
stimulation of my thoughts. 
•1h<~t follows is a m::i.tter of interpretation, but it_ seems that we can infer from 
.1ittgenstein' s words that there were oth~ thinkers involved in the stimulation 
of his thoughts, thinkers of whom l:littgenstein was aware, even if only obliquely. 
•r:.esides these names Hfulsel lists also E.C.assjrer and N.Hartmann, and finally 
a work which I have not yet seen bearing an intriguingly Tractarian title: 
Die Struktur des logischen Gegenstandes,by OoHazay, Berlin, 1915. 
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The challenge, then, is to suggest candidates for such a role outside 
the group of German and Austrian thinkers - especially Herbart, Brentano, 
.. 
:Meinong, Stumpf, Husserl, KtJlpe, Lipps and the Munich Sachverhalt ontologists 
- who hwe distinguished themselves in the course of these investigations. 
Barry Smith 
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APPENDIX I. 65 
Addenda to the Bibliography of Pre-Tractarian Occurrences of the tenn 'Sachverhalt' 
(see pp.14-16 of Smith, ~.) 
1893 HUSSERL, E. 
1893a HUSSERL, E. 
1908 GOMPERZ, H. 
1910 HEINRICH, E. 
1911 SELZ, O. 
? 1912 DRIESCH, H. 
1912 KiJLPE, O. 
"A.Voigts 1 elementare Logik' und meine Darstellungen 
zur Logik des logiachen Calculs", Vierteljahrschrift 
fUr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 17, pp.111-20, cf.p.112. 
11Antwort auf die vorstehende 'Erwiderung' des Herrn 
Voigt", ibid., pp.508-11, cf. pp.5o8 and 510. 
Weltanschauungslehre, vol.II/1, Jena. 
Untersuchungen zur Lehre vom Begriff, Dissertation (under 
Husserl), GHttingen. 
''Exiatenz ala Gegenstandsbestimmtheit", MUnchener Phil-
oeophieohe Abhand.lungen,(Festschrift for T. Lipps), ed. 
AoPfc!lnder, Leipzig, PP• 255-93. 
Ordnungslehre, 1st edo (I have examined only the 2nd ed.1923). 
Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Real-
wissenschaften, I, Leipzig: Hirzel, cf.p.11: 
Wir sehen davon ab, class es Gegenst~de verschiedener Ordnung geben kann, 
je nachdem ob dasjenige, was eine Beschaffenheit oder Beziehung hat, als 
Gegenstand betrachtet wird, oder diese Beschaffenheit oder Beziehung 
oder gar noch weitere Derivata als Gegenstc!lnde gelten. Die .allgemeinsten 
Sachverhalte, die auf Grund dieser Bestimmungen mHglich sind, lassen 
sich als ein Sein oder Bestehen von Gegenstttnden, Beschaffenheiten und 
Beziehungen, als ein ~ von Beschaffenheiten und Beziehungen und als 
ein Stehen in Beziehungen bezeichnen. (Cf. the quotation from Selz 1913 
on p.'51 above). 
1913 HUSSERL, E. 
1913 REINACH, A. 
1915 MEINONG, A. 
Ideen zu einer reinen Phttnomenologie und phllilomenologischen 
Erstes Buch, Halle:. .. Niemeyer, as repr. from Jahrbuch fUr 
Philosophie und phMnomenologische Forschung, 1, 1-323. 
"Die apriorischen Grundlagen des-·bttrgerlichen Rechts", 
in Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phllnomenologische Forschung, 
1,pp.~847, repr. in Reimch 1921 and as a book:~ 
Ph!tnomenologie des Rechts, Munich: K~sel, 1953. 
fiber Moglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Leipzig: 
Barth , pp. 153, 157f, 255. 
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APPEIIDIX II • .A Short Glossary of Meinongean Terminology in the Tractatus 
q = probu~ly obtained by back-translation of Russell's En~lish translations 
of Meinong's original German terms. 
~~ = corresponds to a marginal note in the margin of onr or other of the 
two copies of ths Tractatus annotated by Ryie, now deposited in the 
1ib1·nry of Lineacre College, Oxford. Ryle's notes usually consist 
of either '.AJ,J' (for Alexius Meinong) or 'AM?',with indications in the 
text, but sometimes he gives references to passages in Meinong 1 s works , 
nnd sometimes he includes short comments. 
~ ~~ Anna.hme 4.063,(cf. Russell, Principles (1903) § 477). 
J:/ ~~ bestehep, das Bestehen; bestehen aus , Bestandteil 
Dimension 5.475 see Farbenraum 
existieren, die Existenz 
p ,. Exp on en t ? 
I={ ~~ der Fall sein 
~~ formale Eigenscha:f'ten 4.122 
~~ Farbenraum 2.0131 
cf. Meinong 1903 .• § 5 Die Farbenraum und seine Dimensionen: 
Wie jeder eigentliche K6rper, so ist auch die Farbenk6rper im 
Raume und partizipiert an dessen Eig~nchaften; den bier in 
Betra.clt kommenden Raum aber ganz ausdrtlcklich as Farbenraum 
zu bezeichnen und als das eigentliche Objekt apriorischer 
Farbenerkenntnis dem Farbenk6rper als dem Objekt der ein-
sohlBgigen, im Prinzip empirisohen Feststellungen ganz grund-
slitzlich gegenilberzustellen, k6nnte, wenn ich recht sehe, Uber 
manche Schwierigkeit hinweghelfen. Insbesondere m6chte dadurch 
die Gefahr, wenn nicht beseitigt, so doch einigermassen ferner 
gertlckt sein, die Dimensionen des Farbenraumes von speziellen 
Bestimmungen am Farbenk6rper nicht ausreichend auseinander zu 
halbm ••• (p.12) er. e.lso p39: 
Unser Wissen vom Farbenraume iat von Natur ebenso apriorisch 
wie unser Wissen vom eigentlicben Raume: es ist Farbengeometria. 
Unser wissen vom Farbenk8rper ist von Natur empirisch und in-






67 MEIN ONG-GLOSSARY 
Cf.also Meinong 1907, p.11. In relation to the text of 2.0131 Jl3le pointe 
to the following reference to Meinong'a fiber Annahmen (1910), p.135: 
Kann ich also allgemein ein Objek:tiv erfasaen, obne ein Objekt A 
mitzuerfassen? Die Verwandtschaft mit der anderen Fr88e, ob man 
an Rot denken kann, ohne an Ausdehnung, und ob etwa an Farbe, ohne 
an eine bestimmte Farbe zu denken, liegt auf der Hand. 




interns Relation 4.123 
Kornplex 
Konfiguration 
M8elichkeit See Wahrscheinlichkeitss!tze 
nesative Tatsache 
neben 4.111 Ryle compares Wittgenstein's 
Das Wort "Philosophie" muss etwas bedeuten, was Uber oder unter, 
aber nicht neben den Naturwissenschaften steht. 
with Meinong's 
Was den Besten aller Zeiten als letztes und var allem wilrdiges 
Ziel ihres Wissenstriebes vorgeschwebt hat, jenes Erfassen des 
Weltganzen nach seinem Wesen und seinen letzten GrUnden, das kann 
doch nur Sache einer umfassenden Wissenschaft [Metaphysik, Philosophie, 
Gegenstandstheorie] sein neben den Einzelwissenschaften.(Meinong, ed., 
1904, p.4, Meinong's own emphasis). 
ft Nichtbestehen 
Notwendigkeit see Wahrscheinlichkeitssft.tze below. 
~~ nur-m8glich 2.0121 Cf .Keinong 1915 pp.99f: 
Es ist der Fall, von dem der so populllre Satz gilt: was tatsAohlich 
- ·man sagt gew8hnlich "wirklich" - iat, das ist auch m6glich. Es ist 
eine gleich den sonstigen i.mplizierten M6glichkeiten meist praktisch 
ziemlich unwichtige M6glichkeit, die hinter der Tatsltchlichkeit in 
besonderem Masse als blosses Beiwerk zurUcktritt. Ein solches Objektiv 
ist eben "auch" m6glich, und das ist eine ganz andere Sachlage, als wenn 
etwas gar nicht tatsllchlich, also "nur" m8glich ist. Auf Wendungen 
dieser Art kann man sich berufen, wenn man M6glichkeiten, die bloss 
68 MEIN ONG-GLOSSARY 
in Tatsltchliohkeiten impliziert sind, soldien, die gleichsam 
Eigenberechtigung haben, gegenUber mit etwas barbarischer, aber, 
wie mir s cheint, deutlicher Ausdruck:sweise als "Auchm6glichkei ten" 
benennt, denen man die eigenberechtigten M8glichkeiten ala "Nurm6s-
lichkei ten" an die Seite gestellt werden k8nnen. Von den Nur-
m8glichkeiten ist im Sinne des Komplementengesetzes zu behaupten, 
dass jede mit der Nurm6glichkeit des Gegenteils zusammenbesteht. 
Cf .also .2E.·.ei!·PP•222f; Findlay, 1963 pp.206ff; Griffin,1964,p.39n. 
Meinong's usage seems also to have inf1.uenced Ingarden in his 
opposition between auch-intentionale and rein intentionale Gegenstlinde 
in 1964/65. 
~ Operation The parallels between Meinong' s theory of operations, whi_ch is 
presented in the 6th chapter of his fiber Annahmen,and Wittgenstein's 
theory of operations in the Traotatus have been insufficiently stres-
sed. (As have also the parallels with Husserl's early theory of oper-
ation~· developed at the time of his Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891): 
see especially Husserl 1970). Meinong writes: 
Soviel scheint mir zunRchst sicher, dass man das hypothetische 
Urteil erleben kann, diese aus Annshmen und Urteilen zusammengesetzte 
Operation, ohne Uber dieses Annehmen und Urteilen hinauszugehen, 
und sonaohauch,ohne jene Bedeutung mitzuerfassen. Weiter schei.nt 
mir nun, dass dieselbe Operation auch zu Erfassen ihrer Bedeutung 
dient, sobald man von ihr nur sozusagen den erforderlichen Ge-
brauch maoht •••• [Fundierung kennen wir] bisher nur als Objekt-
:f'u.ndierung, d.h. als Fundierung .!2,!! Objekten durch Objekte; k6nnte 
es nun nicht auch eine Objektivf'undierung geben, bei der bier 
zunltchst nur an Fundierung durch Objektive gedacht ist? Genauer 
also: kHnnte die im obigen beschriebene Operation an Vorder- und 
Nachobjektiv nicht die produzierende T~tigkeit sein, die etwa ein 
neues Vorstellungs- oder Begriffsgebilde ergibt, das ein Superius 
erfasst, dessen Inferiora in flhnlicher Heise Objektive sind, wie 
solches etwa bei einem Kollektiv von Objektiven der Fall ist. 
(p.208.) 
Meinong distinguished not only the 'Wenn '-Operation, but also !Aber!. 
and (presumably) 'Und!.Operations, and Operations 'die man durch "ja" 
oder "nein" ausdrtlckt'. Note that 'Wann' here cannot be the 'Wenn' 
of material implication (though each o~Lthe other operations here 
•discussed in detail in K. Mulligan's forthcoming Manchester dissertationo 
MEINONG-OLOSSARY 
menti onod c11n b a correlRted wi th ono or othe r t ruth-1\mctional operation 
or the t yp o admit t ed iJ1 i ho Tr a c tntus : tho 11J o.11 -opor u t ion , f o r oxnmplo . 




Ao cording to the account of Wittgenste in' s theory of operations given in 
the text above (see esp. pp. 3or) Wittgen s t e in oould not have allowed 
any operationa which, like Meinong ' D ' Wenn' - oper ation, involve 1vha t migh t 
be called meaninG-content or entailment-content (this is the ' extension ~ 
a lism' of tho Tractutu s). To admit such ope r a tions would be to risk 
the breakdown of the i somorphism-rela tion between picturing thought or 
proposition and pictured f act. A philos opher such as Meinong !!2J:. commi t-
tad to the isomorphism theory can, of course , admit non-extens ional 
operations. To admit such opera tions into the Tractatus would, be it noted, 
L~oediately extend the realm of entiti e s admissible a s facts, since it 
. ' , 
would then become possible to include those facts which, although belong-
ing to the object-world toVtard which our thoughts are normally directe d, 
yet involve intensional constituents: most importantly it would be 
possible to include legal facts (Brutus murdered Cae sar, !! Brutus 
murdered Caesar then he mus t be punished), f acts whi ch are - as , for 
example, Engisoh has shown (1962, p.417}-absolute ly unaccountable for 
within a purely extensionalist framework. 
positive Ta tsaohe 





sich verhnlten See Sachverhalt 
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l+ Vlahrscheinlichkei tss.\!.tze ,5.1,511: 
Bs gibt keinen besonderen Gegenstand, der den Wahrscheinlich:ceits-
, 
s~tzen eigen wltre. 
The major thesis of Meinong's mammoth work, tfuer M8gli~it 
wid Wahrscheinlichkeit is precisely that there are such objects 
which are the carriers of possibility- and probability-determinations. 
See Findlay 1963, pp.209ff., and Poser, 1972. 
I:( ~~ Wie wid Was 3.221, .50552, (cf.6.41, 6.432, 6.44) 
Cf. e.g. Meinong, ed., 1904, p.1}5ff: § 7: Koinzidierende GegenstBnde. 




"' * * 
Note that clearly the designation of many of the above terms as 'Meinongean' 
has to be taken with a pinch of salt. But even were it the case that this -
termi.uological overlap could be shown to rest on absolutely no direct influence 
of Meinong' s works upon Wittgenstein this would not, by the arguments of § 0 
above, deprive these notes of all value. 
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APPENDIX III. W. Jerusalem and the Context Principle. 
The following passages are taken from Jerusalem's book Die Urth!il.sfunction. 
Eine psychdlogische und erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung, BraumUller, Vienna 
and Leipzig, 1895, Ch.I, § 4 Logische und gramrnatische Bedeutung des Urtheils-
problems. It has a three-fold interest, (i) because of the light which it 
throws on the prevalence of principles such as that enunciated by Wittgenstein 
at 3.3 that 
nur im Zusammenhange des Satzes hat ein Name bedeutung, 
which was in turn inspired by a virtually identical principle defended by 
Frege in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); (ii) in virtue of the fact that 
Jerusalem's Einleitung in die Philosophie (Vienna, 1897) was to be found in 
the library of Wittgenstein's father in Vienna; (iii) and also because Jerusalem, 
Profe3sor of Philosophy in Vienna, a philosopher (distantly) allied to both 
Mach and Herbart , seems to have enjoyed a certain vogue inAustria at the 
begiru~ing of the century (his Einleitung,for example, had gone into 10 editions 
by 1923). 
p.26 Das Wort hat ••• eine, ich mHchte sagen, sinnliche, physiologische Selbst-
ttndigkeit, als die Articulationen, die zum Aussprechen desselben nHtig 
sind, einen relativ abgeschlossenen Act bilden. Gegen die psychologische 
Selbst!tndigkeit, die man dem Bedeutungsgebiet eines Wortes zuzuschreiben 
pflegt, ja, die man sogar oft als selbstverst!l.ndlich betrachtet, muss je-
doch schon hier energisch Einspruch erhoben werden. zu einem wirklichen 
Leben gelangt das Wort erst in demjenigen Gebilde, in welchem auch die 
Sprache selbst erst wirklich und lebendig wird, nttrnlich im Satze ••• Das 
Wort hat in der Sprache nur als Element des Satzes wirkliche Existenz, 
und nur der Zweig der Grammatik, der sich mit dem Satzbau beschttftigt, 
k.J.!lJl die Gesetze des wirklichen Sprachlebens cnthUllen. 
p.28 Das Wort, aagten wir eben, gewinne erst im Satze wirkliches Leben und 
Sein. Der Glaube an die psychologische Selbstttndigkeit der Wtlrter als 
TrMger bestimmter Vorstellungen wird indessen durch mannigfache Umst!lnde 
erzeugt und befestigt. ••• die Sprache [wird] nur in S~tzen actuell 
[und man kann] ihr Leben und ihre Gesetze nur an dem erforschen und er-
kennen ••• ,was von einem bestimmten Individuum als Ausdruck seines psych-
ischen Geschehens in Stttzen verk~rpert wird. 
p.30 Noch viel weniger als das Urtheil darf ~ Begriff eine von seinem 
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Zeichen unabh!fngige Existenz beanspruchen. Der Begriff entsteht erst 
infolge sprachlich gedachterUrtheile, seine Existenz ist durchaus ab-
hllng{g von der eines conventionellen Zeichens. Das Wort ist nicht der 
Ausdruck, sondern ein Besta.ndtheil des Begriffes, welcher eben durch 
die Synthase von Wort- und Sinnesempfindung entsteht, und nur durch das 
Wort seine Einheit und Consistenz erhtllt. 
Schwieriger scheint es, das Verhttltnis zwischen ~ und Vorstellung 
zu bestimmen ••• /31/ ••• Es ist gewiss nicht mit jeder Vorstellung ein 
Wort, aber auch keineswegs mit jedem Wort eine Vorstellung verbunden ••• 
p.3~ Wollte ich den Vorgang, der in meinem Bewusstsein durch das Wort "Tisch" 
erweckt wird, genau beschreiben, dann ktlnnte dies nur in der Form von 
SUtzen geschehen, deren Subject Tisch wttre. Die Prttdicate dieser SUtze 
liegen potentiell schon im Worte "Tisch", werden aber erst actuell, wenn 
ich meine ganze Wahrnehmung durch ein vollstHndiges Urtheil f orme und 
gestalte. Die Forderung zu solcher Gestaltung und Gliederung ist aber 
schon in dem Worte "Tisch" enthalten, und so ist auch das Wort "Tisch", 
psychologisch betrachtet, nicht eine Vorstellung sondern ein Urtheils-
element.[•J [Auch -Substantive, die sinnlich wahrnehmbare Objecte be-
zeichnen,J erweisen sich ••• als ••• Urtheilselemente, die erst im Satze ihre 
wahre Mission erftillen. Die Wtlrter sind wie behauene, fUr eine beatimmte 
Mauerstelle hergerichtete Steine, denen man es ansieht, auch wenn sie aus 
dem ganzen GefUge /33/ losgel8at sind, dass sie in ein gr~sseres Ganze 
geh"ren und erst da ihre Bestimmung erfUllen. Solche Steine kann man ja 
auch mineralogisch und geometrisch bestimrnen, als ob sie selbstttndige 
Existenz h!ltten, ihre wahre Bedeutung erkennt man jedoch erst, wenn man 
das GefUge kennen lernt, in welchem sie ihren Platz einzunehmen bestimmt 
sind. Die wahre Bestimrnung jedes Wortes ist es, eine Stelle in einem 
Urtheile einzunehmen, und wenn man sie genau untersucht, so entdeckt man, 
wie bei den Steinen, die behauenen Fla'chen und vermag dann anzugeben, 
welche Stelle im Urtheilsgeftlge das Wort einzunehmen bestimmt ist. 
Das Wort ist somit psychologiach nicht Vorstellung, s ondern Urtheils-
element. Sein Bedeutungsgebiet umfasst nicht die Vorstellungen, die es 
erweckt, sondern die Urtheile, in die es als Element eingehen kann. Diese 
Einsicht dUrfte sich, sobald sie allgemein wird, auch fUr den Sprach-
unterricht und bei der Anlegung von WHrterbUchern fruchtbringend erweiseno 
Wir sehen also, dass die Untersuchung des Urtheilsacts sich auchfUr 
grammatische Fragen als bedeutungsvoll erweist. 
•Jerusalem's own emphasis. Compare 2.0122: Es ist urun~glich,dassWorte 
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